The perils of European debt crisis: divergence, retreat or decline?

Recent debacle at the summit of Bruselles in the midst of the political intervention of the EU leaders to facilitate the institutional agreement between the European countries towards the formation of the European fiscal union has caused not only a long-standing dissolution of the “core countries” of the Eurozone and the UK but, more importantly, a non-solvable puzzle on the end scenario of the European debt crisis that pervaded both the eurozone and the countries outside it ever since the beginning of the 2008/2009 financial crisis. The anatomy of the European debt crisis is a multifaceted process that is heavily interrelated with the economic principles of the process of European integration and the unintended consequences that erupted in the recent debt crisis.

The introduction of Maastricht criteria that stipulated fiscal prudence by obliging EU member states to adhere to the level of public debt below 60 percent of the GDP and low fiscal deficit boosted the expectations of stable macroeconomic environment, partly sustained by the European Central Bank which, since its inception in 1999, successfully maintained price stability. Despite an enviable achievement in the stabilization of inflation expectations, the EU Treaty did not stipulate stringent fiscal rules in case of the breach of treaty obligations on behalf of EU member states, neither has European Growth and Stability Pact (EGSP) provided selective mechanisms that would hinge on the EU member state in case Maastricht criteria were not fulfilled. On the other hand, the gradual enlargement of the European union did not finalize in the economic union characterized by the realization of four basic freedoms.

In 1977, Portugal and Spain were acceded into the European Union. Four years late, Greece was admitted as the 12th member of the European community. Over time, the EU grew from an integrated area of 15 Western European countries into a conglomerate of nations that did not impinge of the full-fledged liberalization of the internal market in 1988 but, moreover, has evolved into the spiral that accelerated the community toward the political union. In the mean time, member states of the Eurozone have continuously breached the rules laid out by Maastricht treaty. In bearing the fiscal consequences of the reunification, Germany repeatedly breached the Maastricht criteria both in public debt and fiscal deficit which postponed the introduction of the Euro, following a large shock from gigantic fiscal transfers from high-income West Germany into low-income East German regions. In a similar manner, until 2005, France did not manage to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio under the 60 percent threshold stipulated by the Maastricht criteria.

Nevertheless, peripheral countries such as Spain and Portugal entered the Eurozone at an overvalued exchange rate relative to German mark before the introduction of the common currency. In the following years, these countries, notably Spain, accumulated significant current account surpluses resulted from the inflows of direct investment from the core countries such as Germany and France. These surpluses were, of course, artificial in the sense that the downward convergence of interest rates in the peripheral countries stimulated the over-leveraging of the financial sector which triggered a balloon in the housing sector.

For years, Italy and Greece have repeatedly breached the Maastricht treaty in the fiscal sense. Prior to adjoining the European Monetary Union, Greece repeatedly experienced volatile inflation rates and default on its external obligations and subsequent Drachma depreciation. Italy’s macroeconomic stabilization hinged on the discretion of government spending which, after excessive rises under various transition governments, cumulated in one of the highest debt ratios within the EMU. How could EMU countries, despite a stringent set of rules delineated by the Treaty of Maastricht, pursued discretionary fiscal policies and jeopardized the macroeconomic stability of the national economies and the Eurozone?

Prior to the onset of the financial crisis by the end of 2007, little was known on the perils of excessively leveraged balance sheets which investment banks used to seek high rates of return on high-yield and relatively risky peripheral regions. Until 2007, the exposure of major German investment to over-leveraged financial sector in countries such as Spain and Greece generated sizeable spillover effect. Before the onset of the financial crisis, Spain enjoyed sizeable current account deficit resulted from excessively high and robust overall investment. In 2007, Spain’s investment-to-GDP ratio (31 percent) was roughly comparable to developing Asia. In such highly volatile environment where economic growth departed from its long-run fundamentals, even small-scale macroeconomic shocks can result in a substantial loss of economic activity, notwithstanding the spillovers in the banking system and labor market.

The asymmetry in political structures and underlying macroeconomic fundamentals across member countries casts significant doubt in the long-term stability of the Eurozone as an area with common monetary policy. The necessary condition for the inception of common monetary policy does not hinge on the political initiatives that pervaded the process of European integration but on the careful consideration whether adjoining countries adhere to the macroeconomic criteria as denoted by the Maastricht Treaty. The failure to adhere to the contours of fiscal prudence and budgetary discipline by the major EU member states, with few notable exceptions such as the Netherlands, Austria and Finland, lies at heart of the underlying reasons why significant asymmetry and non-coordination in fiscal policy resulted in the adoption of dispersed economic policies whereas the adverse outcomes were not foreseen neither by the politicians neither by policy advisers and academics.

To a large extent, as the recent debt crisis has succinctly demonstrated, the ultimate goal of the European monetary integration was the build-up of political union. But whereas European politicians were preoccupied with all-embracing design of the EU as unitary political union, they forgot to acknowledge that political union would require the full convergence of economic policies including the integration of the labor market which hardly any political initiative within the EU deemed feasible.

The non-coordination of fiscal policymakers was highly evident in the division of member states on the core countries and EU periphery. Considering the peripherical countries, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece repeatedly proved ill-disciplined in managing the levels of public debt and the magnitude of the budgetary imbalance. Portugal is often the case in point. Prior to the introduction of the Euro, Portugal experienced unprecedented economic boom. Between 1995 and 2001, economic growth averaged 4 percent per annum and the unemployment rate reduced from 7 percent to 4 percent by the end of 2001.

At the same time, nominal wages grew rapidly without the necessary productivity growth compensating for the increase unit labor cost. Alongside the overheating of economic activity, driven by construction boom, current account deficits increased significantly, lowering domestic savings rate. After the country experienced a mild recession in 2003 when domestic output decreased by 1 percent on the annual basis, the slowing of artificial economic growth driven by the Euro boom, turned from temporary into permanent. In the period 2002-2010, growth of domestic output averaged at the level of no more than 1 percent per annum with stagnating productivity and significant pressure on nominal wages. Since the size of the labor cost is the major deterrent on growth, the cure for Portuguese ailing economy is the structural adjustment in the public sector such as the reduction of public debt by generating substantial primary fiscal surpluses and the lowering of government spending. Similarly, the experience of Greece, Spain and Italy suggests the evolution of the same pattern evolving over time although Italy has been known as low-growing economy during the boom time.

However, fiscal policymakers in peripheral countries repeatedly produced ill-conceived fiscal mismanagement of public finances. In 2008, the level of budgetary deficit in Greece exceeded 13 percent of the GDP whereas the country has not adhered to Maastricht criteria ever since the introduction of the Euro. After the depreciation, the net debt as percent of GDP in Greece reached 85 percent of GDP and increased to 110 percent of GDP by the end of 2008. As IMF’s recent forecasts suggest, by 2012, Greece’s public net debt could reach 175 percent of GDP.

The failure to adhere to the common set of principles as delegated by the Maastricht treaty and EU Stability and Growth Pact in the peripheral countries stemmed largely from the mismanagement of public finances and structural rigidity of the public sector with resulting increases in the burden of the labor cost. In addition, the adoption of extraordinary measures embedded in the public sector such as very low effective retirement age and substantial bonuses for civil servants exacerbated the burden of the public debt with unforeseen net financial liabilities of governments which have not mitigated the persistent burden of public debt that grew substantially over time in the EU periphery.

A natural question is whether the exclusion of peripheral countries from the Eurozone might be feasible and whether Greece’s default on external obligations might help overcome country’s mountainous strain on public debt. First, the re-adoption of domestic currencies is hardly a solution to overcome the intricacies of debt crisis. If Greece re-introduced drachma, external obligations would be strained by a painful and enduring bank run since investors would withdraw the deposits from the portfolio and invest it into safer holding with less volatility and uncertainty ahead. Another argument in favor of Greece exiting the Eurozone is that a devaluation of drachma would boost inflationary expectations and consequently reduce the burden of the public debt but given junk score on government bonds, a rather immediate bank run would follow the devaluation of drachma rather than macroeconomic stabilization.

In addition, when Greece’s domestic output is growing far below the long-term potential, inflationary expectations is not a feasible tool to revive the economy from deflationary trap with 16 percent unemployment Moreover, the only feasible and meaningful short-term strategy to boost growth is the reduction of the size of the public sector including the privatization of inefficient state-owned enterprises to generate substantial fiscal surpluses since this is the only plausible measure to tackle the increasing burden of the public debt. As the history of financial crises suggests, the eruptions of banking crises occurred mostly when governments rested on currency devaluations as the ultimate tool to reduce the burden of external debt. In addition, if Greece defaulted on its external obligations, CDS spreads could indicate a snowball effect where Spain, Portugal and possibly Italy could follow the same track.

The question is whether non-coordination between European fiscal policies helped facilitate over-leveraged financial sectors which asked for the bailout by central governments in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis. Over-leveraged financial sectors were attributed to the determinants of various extent. Some argued that over-leveraging is the outcome of innovative financial engineering where fancy mathematicians and physicists applied VaR models to calculate the probability of losses in the portfolio distribution of returns whereas the financial derivative schemes developed by advanced and complex mathematical models were so complicated that nobody, sometimes even mathematicians themselves, could understand sensibly.

On the other hand, the monetary policy perspective of over-leveraged financial sectors has been rather overlooked in policy discussions since periodically low interest rates encourage excessive risk-taking which further facilitated the construction of portfolios with excessively volatile returns that increasingly relied on VaR assumptions whilst fundamentally ignoring the instability of returns from over-leveraged investments. But a more intriguing question pertaining to the banking perspective of financial crises is whether more prudent financial regulation as envisaged from recent stress tests by European Banking Authority can be achieved by raising capital adequacy standards. Unfortunately, the history of Basel accords demonstrates that the banking sector has been prone to search alternative channels to avoid raising capital adequacy ratios through innovative accounting tricks whereas neither Basel I and II envisaged the adverse outcomes from excessive risk-taking. As stress tests indicated, capital adequacy ratios should be increased substantially but, moreover, the regulatory framework should not only build on increasing criteria on Tier I capital and common equity but also on the safeguard despositary insurance of contingent liabilities to mitigate liquidity risk that led to the systemic crisis.

The solution to revive the Eurozone economy and revive it from a decade of flawed political imperatives should not exclude multiple options. The focal point of the Eurozone’s recovery from debt crisis should be to help peripheral countries establishment fiscal prudence, discipline and soundness of the public finances. In fact, the recovery from the debt crisis will endure for more than a decade. The structural adjustment does not rest on the ability of the EU to provide financial assistance to peripheral countries but on the principled and coordinated action to reform inefficient public sectors which are at the heart of the debt spiral since years of generous entitlements to civil servants have tremendously raised the net present value of public debt to the point that peripheral countries are on the brink of default on its external obligations. Without generating substantial fiscal surpluses, there is no feasibility and no realistic scenario under which public debt level would be brought under the control in the near-term perspective. Hence, recent discussions of the consequences of debt crisis in Europe have simply overlooked the importance of growth-enhancing measures as the real cure for growing debt-to-GDP ratio where the measures do not apply to peripheral countries only.

First, in the wake of fiscal insolvency of public pension systems, effective retirement age should be raised substantially for men and women alike. The studies have shown that under the increase in effective retirement age to 65 years, long-term fiscal obligations would reduce and consequently an important step towards long-term macroeconomic stability would be achieved. Nearly every European country is facing low-fertility trap followed from increased affluence and generous early-retirement policies from 1970s onward. Consequently, European government have amounted a mountain of net financial liabilities that exceeded the size of GDP by several times, respectively. Decreasing the size of net liabilities to contemporary and future generations of retirees, requires a robust increase in effective retirement age. Higher retirement age threshold would substantially increase working-age population by encouraging labor market participation among the elderly. Current levels of effective retirement age are unsustainable in the long-run since a growing burden of pension obligations can seriously threaten the stability of the public finance and increase the probability of fiscal insolvency.

Second, European countries suffer from low productivity growth. In some countries, such as Italy productivity growth has remained stagnant over the course of recent two decades while elsewhere productivity growth is to slow to compensate for the increase in nominal wage rates. The evidence, in fact, overwhelmingly suggested that high tax rates are the prime obstacle to greater labor market participation, particularly among the elderly who face high implicit tax rates on work. In particular, to facilitate the channels of productivity growth, marginal tax rates should be decreased substantially. At current levels, marginal tax rates restrain labor supply significantly. In the Netherlands, the top marginal income tax rates reached 52 percent in 2011 which is a serious hinder on the working activity. In this respect, bold tax reforms should be complemented with more flexible labor markets which remain saddled with employment regulations and distort labor supply incentives. Less regulated labor market to supplement greater labor force participation, especially among women, elderly and the youth is vital to enhance productivity growth since living standards by the end of the day are determined by productivity improvements.

Ultimately and most importantly, peripheral countries should be given a free choice whether to withdraw from the EMU since recent financial crisis has shown that Eurozone is a suboptimal currency area which emerged from non-cooperative fiscal policies among its member states that caused adverse outcomes and asymmetric adjustment where macroeconomic stabilization outcomes are mutually exclusive among member states. Asymmetry adjustment that currently threatens the existence and stability of Eurozone lies at the heart of Eurozone’s debt crisis. As a general matter, economic policies have failed to recognize that structural measures in the labor market and fiscal policy regime could facilitate growth enhancement and provide the necessary impetus to stabilization of crisis-impeded monetary union. Recent suggestions by France and Germany for EU member states to form a fiscal union have led to sustained resistance from the UK which dissolved from the fiscal pact.

The ultimate grain of truth in the fiscal union is that a monetary union necessarily requires the coordination of fiscal policies to prevent adverse and asymmetric policy outcomes within the union. The fateful conclusion from recent EU debt crisis is that without the integration of the labor market on the EU level, the monetary integration cannot exist in coherence with asymmetric fiscal policies. In the future, stricter adherence to budgetary discipline will be necessary through budgetary authority. In this respect, countries that fail to adhere to Maastricht criteria and deviate from the fiscal discipline either marginally or substantially should be condemned and pay for their actions of fiscal imprudence by withdrawing from the monetary union.

What went wrong with supply-side economics?

The economic crisis of 2008/2009 had confronted the mainstream economic theory with an unpalatable task of revisiting the notions and perils of the ideas which dominated the course of economic theory in the last few decades. In 2003, delivering a speech to the American Economic Association, Robert Lucas famously noted that the central problem of depression prevention had been solved by mainstream macroeconomic theory which was built by combining the rational expectation hypothesis with New Keynesian macroeconomics. Although one should not obscure the achivements of new classical macroeconomics and new Keynesian macroeconomics, the criticism of contemporary macroeconomic theory is not uniform. It stems from the unrecognized role of systemic shocks in the financial sector and the spillovers from Wall Street to the Main Street. In contemplating the the linkages of over-leveraging and biased financial deregulation, it should not come as a surprise that early warnings of the financial crisis, mainly leveraged borrowing in the U.S subprime mortgage market, were earmarked in the mainstream economic theory.

In fact, in 1970, George Akerlof's influential paper on the issue of adverse selection in the market for lemons, was a landmark achievment in the economic theory since it demonstrated the falacies of perfectly competitive market mechanism when the information on quality of various commodities is distributed unevenly. In addition, a series of papers in 1970s by Joseph Stiglitz on screening theory and asymetric information, has dealt exactly with the central origins of the 2008/2009 financial crisis. Subprime loans and highly-complex derivate schemes which enabled the exponential growth of overleveraging of the banking sector were most likely to be used by the least sophisticated and accordingly the most risky borrowers. The only difference is that in normal circumstance, banks would recognize adverse selection by rationing credit to risky borrowers but the continuous obsession with home-ownership and the reluctance of the Federal Reserve to "remove the bowl of punch when the party started" - to use the analogy of Preston Martin, former Vice President of the FED - added to the turbulence of overleverage that turned into the most disastrous financial meltdown after the Great Depression.

The fact is that contemporary macroeconomics had little to offer to predict the subsequent financial meltdown although Robert Shiller of Yale University has repeatedly warned against unstable stock market fundamentals, particular notorious price-earnings ratios after the dot-com bubble came to burst. However, the central element of the critic of mainstream economic theory should revisit the notorious paradigm of supply-side economics whose intelectual melange of fervent belief in tax cuts and a dangerous preoccupation with deregulation as the cure of the malaise which led to stagflation in early 1970s, have proved how dangerous the conclusions could become.

First, the rise of the supply-side economics in the political economy began in early 1980s. But the intelectual influence of the supply-side economics should not be confined to the theoretical paradigm itself. The field of the political economy of taxation manifested itself as the intelectual triumph of supply-side economics. The original idea of the Laffer curve, the relationship between tax rate and tax revenues, was not disputable after all. In fact, if tax rates reached predatory levels, decreases in total tax burden would yield considerable gains, not only in total tax revenue but also in terms of higher level of productivity. However, when average and marginal tax rates were at moderate levels, it would be foolish to believe immense revenue gains would ensue by reducing the rates of taxation to bottom-levels, arguing for significant gains in terms of employment growth, productivity boost and total tax revenues. Even though cross-country empirical evidence does suggest an increase in tax revenues amid the decline in average tax rate, the pattern is confined to the episodes where average and marginal tax rates were very high, exceeding 70 percent threshold. Once tax rates were reduced, there is no evidence of higher revenue gains.

The major peril of supply-side economics is the claim that tax reduction would boost the aggregate supply and stimulate productivity growth. On the other hand, the valuable contribution of supply-side economics is the notion that additional tax increases do not generate much higher revenue. One should not feel reluctant to recall the 1964 Kennedy-Johnson tax cut which decreased marginal tax rates substantially. Although supply-side economics has repeatedly blasted the intelectual heritage of Keynesian macroeconomics, the 1964 tax reform was itself a Keynesian prescription for the U.S recession in the years prior to Vietnam war. Back in early 1960s, Paul Samuelson wrote that "Congress could legislate, for example, a cut of three or four percentage points in the tax applicable to every income class, to take effect immediately under our withholding system in March or April, and to continue to the end of the year." (link). Therefore, Samuelson's mindful observation that additional spending would not automatically counteract the recession unless complemented by tax reductions, probably would not come due in the framework of supply-side economics. Moreover, what distinguished the supply-side economics from the framework of sound economic analysis taught in microeconomic and macroeconomic textbooks, was adverse propensity to enforce tax cuts for the rich while leaving the middle class and low-income households no pie from tax reductions. The striking features of income inequality in the U.S. suggest that from 1970s, median household income stagnated (link) while top 5 percent of households have received disproportionately windfall gains from tax reductions up the point where more than 85 percent of total income was earned by top 5 percent of households (link). Moreover, one should distinguish between patterns of good and bad inequality as Gary Becker recently suggested (link). It is envitable that income inequality has some great value in the society when market outcomes lead to better overall health, less stress and higher standard of living and the evidence is yet inconclusive whether the narrowing of income inequality would return health improvements for the poor - since poor health outcomes of low-income households are mainly attributed to deteriorating dietary habits and dangerous lifestyle.

While bad inequality, especially rents from non-market outcomes, have precipitated the decline in good inequality in the last two decades, there is an overwhelming evidence that stagnation of median household income (despite moderate productivity improvements) caused a somehow lower quality of the U.S. labor force and a widening gap in educational achievments of American children. The drawbacks of widening inequality were largely ignored by supply-side economics or justified on the hands-off approach to the issues of the poor. It should not be forgotten that negative income tax, which favored low-income families, was suggested by Milton Friedman, whom supply-siders have taken for the intelectual father without a detailed knowledge of his precious contribution to economics.

Second, supply-side economics has been perhaps known for favoring the deregulation as the cure for social ills and staggering income growth. Despite substantial euphoria caused by the pioneers of deregulation of banking and financial sector, the regulatory framework eventually jeopardized sound regulation that could prevent hazardous outcomes as shown in the seminal work of George Akerlof and Joseph Stiglitz. In fact, deregulation of the banking sector, hailed by supply-side economics as the triumph of its own ideology, laid the basis for rigorous financial innovation by special investment vehicles (SIV) and shadow banking institutions.

In fact, deregulation of the banking and financial sector was not the central issue per se. The main systemic flaw was rather the adoption of unsound regulation that did not predict the perils of over-leveraged banking sector and especially the system-wide spillovers during the financial crisis. Moreover, the loosening of the monetary policy and the series of fiscal stimulus have notified two main drawbacks in the macroeconomic outlook. The first is the invariant postponement of taxation fuelled by the mountain of government debt. And the second is the hidden explosive potential for inflation following the flood of money supply in the balance sheet of the banking sector.

Generally speaking, the intelectual adventure of supply-side economics has overlooked the possibility of pitfalls brought up by rigorous tax cuts to the wealthy and deregulation of banking and financial sector. It would not come due to label mainstream economic theory as a cataclysm which the financial crisis proved accordingly. It would be either insensible to tarnish the useful contribution of supply-side economics. In fact, tax cuts do generate systemic incentives, particularly in the response of the labor supply to tax reductions. However, the elusive quest for higher growth and job creation after reducing tax rates for the wealthy, is an important lesson we should learned from the unfortunate turn of supply-side economics in favoring deregulation without acknowledging the possibility of systemic banking collapse and the consequences carried over by society at large.

Demographic patterns and structural change in North Africa and the Middle East

The political turmoil in Tunisia and Egypt that precipitated the abrupt end of decades of political dictatorships that governed the vast majority of countires in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. The political revolution, influenced by democratic upheaval in Tunisia and Egypt, facilitated the attempts to overhaul the autocratic regimes in Bahrain, Syria, Yemen and Libya.

One of the most interesting and highlighting puzzles to resolves is which features contributed to the rise of democratic revolutions sweeping across the entire region. In fact, MENA region is world's largest exporter of oil, enjoying the largest oil reserves in the world. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Algeria, Libya and Kuwait constitute more than 42 percent of world oil reserves. In recent decades, MENA region experienced a growing degree of macroeconomic stability with low and stable inflation rate and steady economic growth. Large oil inflows, driven by the growing oil consumption in emerging markets such as China and India, boosted local currency appreciation and current account surpluses. The rates of growth in recent decade were remarkable, reflecting the growth of domestic demand as well as robust investment as the engine of growth. Countries in the MENA region also enjoyed favorable demographic conditions with low old-age dependency ratio and high share of working-age population, resulting in a demographic dividend which brought robust economic growth.

The indices of political change in the MENA countries prior to the outburst of the political protests in Tunisia and Egypt were nearly impossible to predict since a variety of macroeconomic, demographic and structural indicators facilitate the course of political change in developing countries, shifting from authoritarian political leadership towards a democratic political institutions with free press, free election and a vibrant civil society. Prior to the onset of the protests against authoratic governments in the MENA countries, the latter experienced benign levels of economic freedom. In the MENA region, the majority of countries experienced rampant corruption, heavily regulated labor markets, financial underdevelopment and inefficient legal systems. Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia enjoyed the highest degree of economic freedom in the region while Yemen, Syria and Algeria were already suffering from institutional paralysis and bad governance which brought these countries on the brink of failed states. If political change could be predicted on the basis of the level of overall economic freedom, Yemen, Syria, Algeria and Libya would experience the highest likelihood of political protests that would eventually lead to the political change.

Prior to the independence from France, MENA countries have been plagued by authoritarian governments given the extensive reserves of oil and natural gas. The absence of market institutions based on the rule of law under good governance and independent judicial systems eventually intensifed the rise of hybrid political regimes prone to corruption and poor governance. Even though corrupt military rule and political dicatorship precipitated the rise of the protests against authoratic rule, the pattern of structural change could be easily seen from the changing demographic landscape across the MENA region.

For most of the 20th century, countries in the MENA regions experienced rising income per capita levels. In fact, the growth of per capita incomes in North Africa surpassed the regional average given the fact that North African countries enjoyed high relative levels of income per capita at the beginning of the 20th century compared to Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, in 1913, Tunisia enjoyed higher per capita income than Mauritius. The change in the demographic structure of the population began after 1950s. In all countries of the MENA region, the fertility rate decreased substantially. In Syria, the fertility rate almost halved between 1950-1955 and 2005-2010, from 7.30 to 3.29. The same trend in the fertility rate swept across the entire region. In Libya, the fertility rate between 2005 and 2010 fell below 3 children per women while Tunisia's fertility rate dropped below 2 children per women in the same period. The astounding drop in fertility rates strongly reflected the growth in per capita incomes which boosted domestic consumption of durable and non-durable goods. In addition, oil-exporting countries such as Libya and Bahrain have experienced a substantial increase in export earnings. Large inflow of oil earnings, in fact, unleashed the income effect, brining higher spending on education and infrastructure. The distribution of literacy rates across countries (link) shows that literacy rates in MENA regions are remarkably high. In fact, Bahrain and Turkey boast of 88 percent literacy rate. Libya remained the North African leader in literacy rate (86.8 percent), ahead of Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria which, given the fragmentation and dichotomy of the population, enjoy literacy rates below 80 percent of the total population.

Countries from the MENA region differ substantially in the demographic projections of old-age dependency ratio. The estimates by the UN suggest that by 2030, the dependency ratio in North Africa and the Middle East is expected to experience a persistent rise. In fact, under constant fertility rates, the share of the population 65+ is expected to increase by 25 percentage points in Bahrain, 24 percentage points in Libya, 23 percentage points in Tunisia, 20 percentage points in Algeria, 15 percentage points in Syria and Saudi Arabia and 14 percentage points in Egypt. In Turkey, favorable fertility assumptions predict 7 percentage point increase in old-age dependency ratio until 2030. The empirics behind the clear explanation of fertility dyanmics across the MENA region reveals a persistent shift towards rapidly aging population across the entire region. The expedience of high fertility rates boosts the demographic dividend alongside the growth in income per capita until the break-even point when the pressure of aging population raises public pension expenditure and the introduction of social security schemes. These schemes, in fact, do not pose a systemic threat to the long-term solvency of public pension system as long as high fertility rates boost stationary population growth. The remarkable decrease in the fertility rates in the MENA is partly beared by the increasing amount spent on education. For instance, Tunisia's education spending amounted to 7.2 percent of the GDP. The ratio is higher than in many advanced countries in the world. In 2007, Italy spent 4.3 percent of GDP on education, the same ratio as Algeria in the year later. The increasing amount of education expenditure, in both absolute and relative sense, reflects robust literacy rates for middle-income countries of the MENA region. In fact, the increasing amount of education expenditures per inhabitant boosted the information awareness by driving up reading, mathematical and computer literacy. Higher literacy rates, compounded by free access to various Internet applications, could substantiate hypothetically greater awareness of the public demanding political liberties, freedom of assembly and free press.

The demographic transition in the Middle East and North Africa is remarkably uneven, reflecting the variation in income per capita across the region. One of the key drivers of the demographic adjustment is the chagning immigration landscape. Traditionally, North African countries have boosted one of the highest outward migration rates, particulary into Italy and France where Muslims account for about 9 percent of the population, the highest share in Western Europe. In addition, with 2.01 children per women, France enjoys one of the highest fertility rates in Europe. A brief overview of the ethnic fertility rates in France shows that French women of the Muslim origin boost significantly higher fertility rates compared to immigrants from Western countries. For instance, the fertility rates for women of Algerian and Morroccan descent exceed the fertility rates of Spanish and Italian immigrants by almost three times. In the next decade, income per capita across the Arab world is expected to increase robustly. Higher incomes would mean a shift towards the increasing amount of expenditures on durable goods. The change in the consumption pattern would be accompanied by a robust decline in the relative amount of income spent on food and other non-durables. Hence, the assumed fertility rates would converge to the Despite the prolonged decline in fertility rates across the Arab world, the demographic transition could precipitate the subsequent decline in robust economic growth rates which exacerbate the rapid rise in per capita incomes in the MENA region.

The peculiar feature of the majority of countries within the MENA region with the ecxeption of Turkey is the presence of natural resource barriers. The abundance of natural resources, such as oil, phosphate and natural gas, is a major constraint on the quality of public sector governance replaced by the seizure of the state by powerful political elites such as the military regime during the Mubarak rule in Egypt prior to the 2011 revolution. Unless accompanied by democratic institutions and systemic constraints on the executive power, the political revolution can eventually result in the organic evolution of the failed state with a strong persistence of the old elites pushing for the status quo to protect the privileges preserved under the old system. The Arab awakening signalled the beginning of the demographic transition with decreasing fertility rates and slowly growing old-age dependency ratios. Hence, diminishing returns to demographic dividend and the gradual relative decline of the share of the working-age population both indicate a tendency towards greater democratic governance.

Charter cities

The idea of charter cities, originally promoted by Stanford economist Paul Romer, sparked a lively academic debate in the field of economic development. The idea of charter city rests on the premise of creating special reform zones within countries. The reform zone would not be governed by the prevailing system of formal and informal rules within countries. The concept of charter city would serve as an intellectual laboratory of ideas in which governments would be let to quickly adopt innovative system of rules. The purpose of charter cities is the empowerment of incentives in world's less developed countries to develop human capital skills, hence, to increase the level of productivity and real wages that could foster the increase in the standard of living. By and large, the core idea of building a charter city means building a city of about 1000 sq. kilometers in the unoccupied land of the host country and adopting an innovative system of formal and informal rules provided by the source country. The example of charter city include selling Guantanamo to Canada and turning the little piece of Cuban land into Caribbean Hong Kong by adopting a formal system of rules and governance based on limited government, strong rule of law and free market; and turning the new territory into manufacturing hub that could serve as a source of income for workers across Caribbean islands such as Haiti. The charter city would not only provide the opportunity for testing intellectual ideas and innovations but also migrational opportunities for individuals from world's most impoverished countries such as Haiti. The coordination of the charter city is managed by a triangle. First, the host country would provide the piece of land. Second, the source country would provide the infrastructure, human capital and ideas. And third, the guarantor country would provide the assurance that the charter would be respected by both countries.

The concept of the charter city has gained significant attention by development experts in discussing developmental malaise in world's least developed countries in Africa. The empirical evidence on Africa's underdevelopment is striking. It suggests a blinking interplay of corruption, institutional fragility and state failure. According to African Development Indicators, about 75 percent of firms in Cote d'Ivoire identify corruption as the major constraint in doing business. In Ethiopia, less than 2 percent of females enroll tertiary education. Moreover, the average Ethiopian female can expect only 7 years of total schooling. In Liberia, about 11 percent of married women partake a contraceptive use by any method. Hence, one third of young Liberian women, aged 15-19. In addition, 60 percent of Liberians live below $2 per day. In Mozambique and Sierra Leone, only 45 percent of young women are literate. A female at birth in Sub-Saharan Africa can expect to experience no more than 8 years of total schooling throughout her life.

The perennial question in the establishment of charter cities is whether the idea can serve as a source of good rules, promoting good governance through low-cost contract enforcement. Institutional fragility of states across world's least developed countries is largely the economic outcome stemming from wrong development diagnostics, mismatched policy choices and a rigid structure of formal and informal institutional arrangements which resulted in a myriad of bad rules and corrupt political leadership across the specturm of world's poorest countries. The general conclusion from the lessons of development policy is that in the last century, development policy failed to facilitate meaningful prescriptions for a permanent rise of GDP per capita. In particular, the misdiagnosis of essential development dilemma is not a consequence of technical failure in delivering concrete solutions to applied issues of economic development but a consequence of mismatched theoretical foundations which supplied wrong assumptions. Theoretical models of economic growth and development in late 1950s and early 1960s rested on the assumption on output per worker as an increasing and diminishing function of the capital per worker. Although the validity of the neoclassical growth theory remains undisputed, development policy and international aid donors failed to recognize that increasing the amount of aid does not lead to better development outcomes. In fact, the majority of Sub-Saharan countries experienced the relative decline of GDP per capita in the 20th century. In 1913, the GDP per capita of Ghana (in 1990 international dollars) represented 42 percent of the average GDP per capita of European periphery. In 2008, Ghana's GDP per capita represented merely 8 percent of the average GDP per capita of European periphery. By the available statistics, Algeria was the second wealthiest country in Africa, only after South Africa. In 1913, Ghana was the fourth richest society in Africa, only after South Africa, Algeria and Egypt. In 2008, Ghana's GDP per capita was ranked 20th in Africa, in the same range as Angola, Lesotho and Nigeria.

The question surrounding the emergence of the charter city is whether it can serve as a treatment to the contagious sclerosis of fragile institutional structure in failed states, marred by poor governance and the lack of law and order, causing the failure to enforce private contracts as to ensure the rule of law and provide the institutional impetus for sound governance and better formal and informal rules. A notable criticism of the institutional fragility in world's less developed countries pertains to the capture of the state by the political elites. The political elites in world's poorest regions have provided sufficient conditions for the capture of government and judicial system by incorporating a system of powerful informal arrangements through bloated corruption which consequently impaired investment and ultimately resulted in the expropriation of private property rights. The institutional chaos in the most failed states of the world culminated into behavioral adaption to bad rules. The sequence of harmful economic policies eventually seized upon poor development outcomes such as high rates of poverty, stagnating income per capita, low life expectancy and poor health and education indicators.

The foremost task of the charter city should facilitate the institutional decency to enforce private contracts without transaction cost barriers and ensure a robust system of the rule of law since better rules nonetheless depend on how informal institutions such as culture, habits and behavior embrace the virtues of free markets, limited government and the rule of law. Aside from the essential infrastructural arrangements, the provision of institutional conditions for living under a different set of rules does not necessarily imply sufficient prerequisites for the productivity growth that could, in the long run, transform the charter city from low-wage pool of unskilled labor into high-wage urban agglomeration. What is needed for a charter city to flourish is the acceptance of informal institutions of the liberal society such as the freedom of contract and the freedom from corruption. One should not hesitate that economic and personal liberties in world's poorest countries are plagued by predatory rent-seeking political behavior as well as contended against the principles of adherence to formal rules. Without a sensory adherence to these principles, it would be impossible to envisage the charter city as a solution to world poverty and underdevelopment.

For a charter city to provide a clear and cohesive framework of rules, it is essential to provide the credibility and predictability of rules. In early 1950s, Hong Kong was a small island chartered by the British who established a system of credibility over centuries. Hong Kong was the only place where Chinese workers were allowed to migrate from the mainland China. The credibility of the rules, emphasizing limited government over extensive government intervention, free markets over regulated command-and-control economy and the rule of law over political discretion and interest-group politics, proved vital in Hong Kong’s steady economic growth in the 20^th century. In 1950, Hong Kong’s income per capita was around GBP 2,500. By 1997, the average income per capita rose to GBP 20,000.

The idea of building charter cities to boost income per capita by innovative framework of governance is a valuable alternative to the mainstream development policy. First, setting a charter city in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America would encourage seasonal and permanent migration flows from areas with low population density both on domestic and international scale. David McKenzie and John Gibson examined the impact of New Zealand’s Recognized Seasonal Employer program (link), aimed at encouraging seasonal migration from Pacific islands Tonga and Vanuatu to New Zealand, benefitting employers at home. The empirical evidence and policy conclusions suggest that seasonal migration is offering a triple win since a migrant, the sending country and the receiving country benefit from participating in seasonal migration program:

“Nevertheless, there are several caveats to these conclusions. The first is that development is a long-term process, and some of the effects of the RSE may only materialize over many years of community involvement. These could include positive effects such as greater asset-building, investments and skill development if workers return for many seasons, as well as potential longer-term negative effects of continual absence of family members on family and community relations. Secondly, while the gains to households from this seasonal migration are large, they still pale in comparison to the gains from permanent international migration (McKenzie et al, 2010). A key policy issue is therefore the extent to which seasonal migration can or cannot eventually open up avenues for permanent migration. Finally, as with all evaluations, there is the question of how far the policy details and findings can be extrapolated to other settings and that it was developed drawing on lessons from experiences around the world should provide some external validity. As temporary migration programs are increasingly emphasized in policy discussions, there is likely to be plenty of scope for governments and researchers to work together in the future in assessing how well these lessons translate.”

Second, charter cities would nevertheless spur the diffusion of knowledge into the countries of poor regions in the world. In its most distinctive form, charter cities would be similar to the role of small states in the global economy. For instance, consider Mauritius. Back in 1968, when the island gained the political independence from the United Kingdom, the economic prospects of the country were undermined by rapid population growth, rachitic productivity and overdependence on sugar as the only export industry. In addition, trade policy imposed high tariffs and import quotas to protect sugar manufacturers. Since it was impossible to dismantle the barriers to trade, the government of Mauritius responded by creating a virtual special export zone. Any foreign and domestic company could enter and exit the export zone by retaining the profits earned. Companies within the export zone operated under different rules with no trade restrictions such as tariffs, import quotas, voluntary export restraints etc. Hence, the only entry requirement for locating in the special zone was that companies manufacture only for exports as not to compete with domestic markets. The special export zone proved to be a success story. Productivity and employment rates increased sharply, boosting income per capita and standard of living. In 2010, Mauritius’s GDP per capita ($15,500) is the second highest in the region, only behind Gabon ($14,600). The experience of Mauritius with the special export zone and its consequent impact on the economic prosperity of the island, suggests that institutional competition ultimately rewards the institutional structure with better economic outcomes. The entire concept of the charter city is based on encouraging the institutional competition between charter cities and politico-economic systems in poorer countries where charter cities would be most likely to settle. Low initial level of income per capita in charter cities would encourage low-wage employment with unskilled labor. The experience of countries such as Mauritius, Singapore and Hong Kong suggests that favorable institutional features at the beginning stage of development result in better economic policies, ultimately leading to stable economic growth, higher standard of living and better education and health indicators. In Mauritius, the judicial independence from political influence has been enhanced by delegating the highest court of appeal to the British Privy Council, a royal judicial committee (link), full powers of judicial authority.

Many smaller countries in the 20^th century, known for good development outcomes, have adopted roughly similar institutional impetus for economic growth and development. In Africa, countries with the highest level of economic freedom and the lowest perception of corruption, such as Mauritius, Botswana and Namibia, enjoy the highest level of GDP per capita in the African continent. In spite of the abundance of natural resources, Botswana adopted market-friendly economic policies in the second half of the 20^th century, conducive to private enterprise and investment. According to World Bank, it takes 152 hours to pay taxes in Botswana compared to Sub-Saharan average of 315 days. In addition, a claimant in Botswana can expect to recover 63.7 cents per $1 from an insolvent firm compared to 8.4 cents per 1$ in Angola, 16 cents per 1$ in Niger and 0 cents per 1$ in Madagascar.

And third, charter cities would vastly improve the infrastructure of the residents, choosing freely to enter and exit the city. Households in countries such as Guinea still lack the access to electricity, forcing students to do the homework under streetlights and use the car park lights to review school notes (link). Despite being one of the largest receivers of aid per capita, Guinea still suffers from the lack of widespread access to electricity. One could hardly believe that the efforts pledged by international aid donors to reduce poverty and improve the standard of living across the African continent, were not sufficient. What created the black hole, such as the above in Guinea, is the institutional structure plagued by persistent corruption, political cronyism and bad governance, creating bad rules and wrong incentives. Charter cities would ingeniously cure the widespread persistence of misrule and political misconduct since the system of rules would be defined by the founding charter of the city. Good prospects of charter cities would require free entry and exit from the city as well as transparent and honest oversight of the respect for rules by independent judicial authority, managed by a guarantor country such as the United Kingdom, U.S. or Canada. In the proposed form, a typical charter city would become a manufacturing hub. In particular, it would enable access to low labor costs and significant economies of scale to technology entrepreneurs from rich countries as well as transparent contract enforcement, law and order and the security of private property rights. On the other hand, cities would enable millions of people from poor countries to migrate to chartered cities and seek employment opportunities in an environment, safe from corruption, political restraint, violence and bad governance. Hence, charter cities would provide a necessary input to the intellectual competition of ideas in economics, law and political philosophy and elsewhere to be implemented in chartered cities.

The concept enables social scientists and development experts a real-world experiment of ideas. Hence, charter cities could provide a safe haven for prosecuted individuals in poor countries, suffering from judicial errors, physical and military violence or illicit property expropriation. The UN estimates that, over the next few decades, 3 billion people will move to cities. The inflow exerts a growing pressure on urban agglomerations. The lack of basic infrastructure and the continuity of predatory misrule could cause a rapid growth of slums in larger cities which, by and large, are the main source of infectious diseases, HIV prevalence and youth crime since the absence of access to clean water, electricity and education are the major impediment to the improvement of development outcomes in poor countries. A charter city could flourish to become an impulsive alternative to the current state of overdependence on foreign aid. However, it should be unambiguously clear that adherence to good rules and governance requires a bold and decisive change in the set of informal behavior; in which corruption, crime and nepotism are doomed to the fullest possible extent by the full enforcement of private contracts and the rule of law.

Foreign aid and development economics

The aim of main research agenda of development economics in the last century was to provide an evolving approach to curing the persistence of poverty and underdevelopment in world's least developed and developing countries. High economic growth in developing countries in the last decades has changed many developing nations into middle-income countries. For instance, real economic growth rate in China and India from 1960 onwards averaged 6.67 percent and 3.49 percent, respectively. In 2010, China and India were already classified as lower middle-income countries, belonging to the same income group as El Salvador, Armenia and Philippines. In the recent year, China's GDP per capita was higher than GDP per capita of many high-growing developing nations such as Ukraine, Nambia, Armenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and roughly at the same level as Algeria. Over the last decade, the economic growth in developing countries accelerated, driven by an increase in global commodity prices, robust investment rates, expansionary monetary policy and a growing domestic consumption. The economic growth in a majority of African states stagnated, consequently leading to a decrease in the overall standard of living. Between 1960 and 2009, average real GDP growth was negative in countries such as Congo, Democratic Republic (-2.26 percent), Liberia (-1.51 percent), Niger (-1.02 percent), Zambia (-0.52 percent) and Zimbabwe (-0.02 percent) with many other African countries with little or no growth in the second half of the 20th century. The stagnation of income per capita in countries such as Sierra Leone is largely the result of civil war and severe political instability, creating domestic violence and the persistence of poverty, malnutrition and AIDS/HIV prevalence. From the second half of the 20th century onwards, international aid donors have contributed significant amounts of foreign developmental assistance in various forms such as medical care and vaccination against polio, AIDS/HIV, measles and malaria, direct cash transfers and physical infrastructure. Despite significant official and unofficial developmental assitance from international aid donors, dispersion of real income per capita, measuring the level of cross-country convergence or divergence of income per capita, the gap in economic development widened in the course of the last century. In 2010, the percentage of countries with the level of real GDP per capita $1,500 or below equaled almost 20 percent (link).

The rise of development economics in the 20th century was a natural response to growing disparities in income per capita between rich and poor countries. In the framework of neoclassical theory, development economics emerged from a neoclassical growth theory, pioneered by the famous Solow-Swan model. In the simplest possible form, the growth of output per capita depends on the capital per worker and the initial level of output under stable rate of national saving and capital depreciation. Assuming diminishing returns to scale and constant rate of population growth, the increase in capital per worker would increase the output per worker that would, hence, approach its steady-state equilibrium. Theoretical notions of the Solow-Swan model were tested against the empirical data on economic growth. The key assumption of the neoclassical growth model is that poor countries would tend to catch-up rich countries, assuming higher output growth in poor countries. The convergence of income per capita would imply a neg relationship between the initial level of output per capita and output growth over time. Thus, countries with lower levels of output per capita in the initial period would experience faster rates of output growth. Consequently, the output per capita and the standard of living would approach to the level in rich countries. The empirical tests of the Solow-Swan model failed to confirm the theoretical hypothesis since economic growth rates in 20th century in developed countries were higher compared to developing countries. The divergence of income per capita led to the subsequent modifications of the Solow-Swan model. In fact, the main criticism of the model points out that the model itself failed to capture the role of technological progress in determining the level of output per worker. The mysterious growth episode in Japan and other East Asian nations posed a difficult question. How can a country with low initial level of output per worker at the end of the WW2, exceed the productivity level in rich countries? The obvious answer is that Solow-Swan growth model failed to capture the role of technology shocks which violate the assumption of diminishing capital returns, what could explain why initially poor countries subsequently converged to the level of productivity in rich countries and then exceeded the level. The phenomenon, known as growth residual, has subsequently reduced the predictive power of the Solow-Swan model since a considerable share of economic growth was not ascribed to capital and labor inputs but rather to the persistent role of technological change.

Policy implications from Solow-Swan model imply that the essential requirement to boost economic growth in a country with low initial level of output per capita is to increase the amount of capital per worker, namely by boosting public and private investment in infrastructure. From 1950s onwards, World Bank had repeatedly boosted the growth of infrastructure by facilitating developmental assistance into world's least developed countries. According to the neoclassical growth theory, higher capital-labor ratio would provide additional investment stimulus, thereby increasing the employment-to-population ratio. Proponents of the foreign aid provided the rationale for higher foreign aid spending by the analogy of post-WW2 Europe when Marshall Plan provided $13 billion, or roughly $100 billion in today's prices, to Western European economies to recover the physical infrastructure which had been destroyed during WW2. Marshall Plan intervention was rather short, quick and finite. The efficacy of foreign aid in Africa is questionable since little or no growth occured in many African states such as Burundi, Benin, Zimbabwe and Congo. Official forecasts from the United Nations from 1950s onwards, based on the famous Harrod-Domar growth model (link), often assumed a rapid increase in the level of GDP per capita in response to the increase in investment rates. The forecasts, based on the theoretical assumption of diminishing capital returns, predicted a persistent convergence of GDP per capita to the level sustained in richer countries. The fact that the launch of extensive investment in infrastructure resulted in further economic stagnation of many African states, has questioned both the validity and quality of prescriptions laid by the mainstream development economics.

The philosophy of the mainstream development economics was sharply criticized in the light of the fact that foreign aid failed to alleviate poverty and made the growth of African economies slower. The efforts by the World Bank have been diverted from correct diagnosis of the developmental issues in African states to repeated initiatives such as the commitment of the international community to increase the share of foreign aid to least-developed countries to at least 1 percent of the GDP. The criticism of the mainstream development economics was already formulated in 1958 when Mont Pelerin Society organized the 9th meeting and development economics seminar where professor Herbert Frankel of the Nuttfield College put forth the criticism of foreign aid and the failure of development economics:

"The lesson that flows from it is that it does pay to go to these remote areas and find out what the problem is, instead of assuming that one knows the problem before one begins. Until recent years, people have simply assumed in many of these territories in Africa, that there were no real, positive signs of enterprise among the indigenous population, which was supposed to be so uninstructed or inert that it was not able to fend for itself, experiment for itself, or improve itself. It was not realised that a reason why there was this apparent lack of initiative in the population was that there were serious customary or legal obstacles to the exercise of ordinary enterprise, even on a small scale."

Given the lack of the comprehensive diagnosis of the causes of underdevelopment in African countries, the mainstream development economics failed to capture the appropriate assumptions in the theoretical models of economic development, upon which developmental assistance was justified. A more reasonable theoretical solution to the economic stagnation and social conflict in Africa has been put forth by the human capital theory. In its broadest and most general form, the theory stated that the economic stagnation of African countries is a consequence of the lack of skills and investment in education that could provide the necessary input to increase the economic growth and, subsequently, alleviate the issues of AIDS/HIV, malaria, child malnutrition and domestic violence. There is no doubt that the growth of education initiatives in Africa has sent many children to school. In addition, many universities in Western Europe and the United States have expanded the initiative and offered students from African states preferential admission criteria in various forms such as graduate fellowships, student grants and lower required standardized test scores, to boost admission rates of African nationals at U.S. universities. The efforts of developed countries to bring educational initiatives to Africa encouraged school participation as well as international opportunities of African citizens to study abroad, even at world's most prestigious and highly-ranked universities. Notwithstanding the importance of education in creating the stock of human capital for the wealth of nations, educational initiatives should address the essential obstacles that creates the failure of African expatriates to return to home countries, hence, bring skills, knowledge and various other forms of human capital, which are essential to the process of long-run growth, the issues of labor market distortions in African countries. These distortions crucially impede the ability of young African graduates to matching jobs in regional labor market.

What the mainstream development economics failed to take into account is the institutional paralysis which prevails in a majority of African countries, plagued by the destructive tribal institutions based on widespread corruption, bribes and domestic violence as means of achieving political power. The prevalence of hybrid institutions, marred by the complete absence of the rule of law and judicial institutions that could facilitate efficient contract enforcement and the protection of private property rights, is not only a severe obstacle to higher economic growth but also the apparent mechanism that captures the set of explanatory features that could possibly account for what caused the misdiagnosis of the African development dilemma. Back in 2002, African Union estimated that each year, corruption costs African economies more than $148 billion or 25 percent of Africa's GDP. The significance of corruption in state structures in Africa manifests itself in poor quality and provision of public services, the absence of judicial independence from political regimes, cumbersome contract enforcement and unprotected private property rights. Such distortions impede the level of trust and provide evolving incentives to subvert the institutional independence into political cronyism, in which corruption substitutes the tax system through bribes and extortion as methods of lowering transaction costs in overcoming the malfunctioning of the judicial system. In 1978, Erwin Blumenthal of the central bank of the Federal Republic of Germany, warned the international community that "Zaire's political system is so corrupt that there's no prospect for Zaire's creditors to get their money back." (link)

The advancement of country's economic prospects requires not only transparent, sound and efficient regulations but, more importantly, highly efficient civil service. In 2010, Transparency International published Corruption Perception Index (link) by measuring the persistence of corruption in public sectors across the world. The findings showed that the vast majority of poor African countries were plagued by extensive and extortionate corruption and ranked in the bottom 20 percent of the distribution. Comparing the level bureaucracy against GDP per capita reveals the amplified evidence of the negative correlation between the efficiency of civil service and the GDP per capita. The ease of doing business in Africa in countries such as Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius and South Africa is remarkably easier with predictable, stable and efficient regulation, compared to countries such as Burundi, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire etc. where highly burdensome administrative procedures in doing business hamper capital formation and restrain productive investment in health-care, education and private-sector infrastructure that could provide the impetus to economic growth.

The relationship between the amount of foreign aid, received by the least-developed countries, and the scope of corruption as a rough approximation of the institutional quality in the least-developed states, could provide the answer to the question whether international donors consider the scope and significance of corruption in allocating the amount of foreign aid. The experience from the last century of development policy, suggest that international donors actually allocated more foreign aid to the countries, suffering from severe state failure, widespread corruption, government failure and the complete absence of judicial independence that could provide a system of checks and balances and the necessary restraint on the violiation of private property rights, extortion and violence by the political elites. In 1999, Alberto Alesina and Beatrice Weder (see "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid," American Economic Review, 92(4), pp. 1126-1137) found that, contrary to arguments of aid supporters, foreign aid is not used to reward good governments since more corrupt governments received more foreign aid and official development assistance from international donors. The most striking evidence, presented by Alesina and Weder, suggests that U.S donors seem to neglect the persistence of corruption in allocating foreign aid to poor countries while, on the other hand, Scandinavian donors deem the persistence of corruption as highly important, hence, rewarding governments with lower extent of corruption.

In the following graph, I estimated the impact of corruption on official development assitance in the sample of 41 least-developed countries in 2008. In the model, I set the official development assitance to be determined by the scope of corruption in least-developed countries. The official development assitance is expressed as a share of representative country's gross national income (GNI) for it provides a better measure of aid dependence than foreign aid per capita since the size of population is controlled by the main assumptions of the model. The data on official development assistance were download from World Bank's World Development Indicators (link). The data on the extent of corruption in least-developed countries were provided by Transparency International's 2008 Corruption Perception Index (link). The extent of corruption varies from 1 to 10, where lower values indicate more persistent corruption. I estimated whether countries with more corrupt governments receive a higher share of foreign aid from international donors. On the basis of 41 least-developed countries, sample estimates suggest that a 1 point improvment in corruption perception index tends to decrease, on average, the share of foreign aid in gross national income, on average, by 2.37 percentage points. Sample estimate of the slope coefficient is statistically significant at 5 percent level. Even though, the variation in corruption perception index accounts for 5.51 percent of the variation in official development assitance, the influence of the extent of corruption on the share of foreign aid in gross national income is not spurious but systematic and persistent.

Corruption and official development assistance

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2010. Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index, 2008.

The estimate suggests that international donors indeed reward more corrupt governments by increasing the share of official development assitance. In 2002, African Union estimated that corruption was costing the African continent $150 billion per year. The estimates of the total cost of corruption provide an ample evidence that, over the last century, international donors consistently allocated foreign aid to more corrupt governments, creating aid-dependent economies, prone to bloated bureaucracies and extractive institutions which subsequently led to the stagnation of income per capita in the last decades. An ample criticism of foreign aid initiative was put forth by Dambisa Moyo (link) in the WSJ two years ago: "The most obvious criticism of aid is its links to rampant corruption. Aid flows destined to help the average African end up supporting bloated bureaucracies in the form of the poor-country governments and donor-funded non-governmental organizations."

The consequence of rootedness of corruption and extractive political institutions in African tribal cultures can be, in a considerable part, drawn upon the colonial heritage that spread throughout the African continent from 19th century onwards. The colonial experience across the African continent (link) served not only as a conquest of newly discovered areas but, moreover, also as an experiment of developing political and economic institutions on the basis of European influence. The colonial heritage in Africa was mainly derived from the European occupation of African lands. Hereto, the presence of European colonisers in Africa provided a long-lasting foundation of the institutional lessons from which the African states went forth.

Given the heterogenity of the European perspectives on institutional development, the colonial period in Africa left a long-lasting impact on the economic and political development in Africa. Africa's richest countries, namely Botswana, South Africa and Mauritius, were influenced tremendously by the colonial heritage. In Botswana and South Africa, the colonial influence of English and Dutch on further economic development was mainly derived from setting strong institutional foundations of economic development such as the rule of law, judicial independence and limited government compared to other African states. Apart from the setting of formal institutions, fostering contract enforcement and the integrity of the political institutions, English and Dutch colonizers provided the establishment of cultural setting not prone to fraud, extortion and extractive institutions. Favorable institutional conditions furthered the advertance of trust and institutional efficiency, which are deemed essential in fostering the development of financial markets. Even the German presence in Namibia from 1884 to 1915 during Deutsch-Südwestafrika (link) fostered, to a certain extent, independent judiciary, relatively sound institutions and cohesive framework of the rule of law. As a result, Nambia retained the status of one of the least corrupt countries in Africa, known for relatively high degree of economic freedom in a regional comparison with other African states.

While the influence of German, English and Dutch colonizers was largely beneficial to African countries from the perspective of economic growth and development over the last century, the presence of French, Italian and Belgian colonizers arises serious concerns over the prospects of economic development across the African continent. The myraid of violence, in countries such as Congo Dem. Rep. and Somalia, which ultimately led to civil wars and the settlement of extractive institutions, largely reflects the innate ability of the colonial policies to provide the necessary conditions for the institutional integrity, the rule of law and stringent property rights that could underline the basis of economic development by restraining the power and domination of political elites and their ability to expropriate private property rights in pursuit of extractive monopoly rents from natural resources. That easily explains why countries such as Congo, Zambia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, in spite of vast reserves of natural resources, were seized by the state capture of political elites. The colonial presence largely determined the size and scope of aid dependency in African states. The most plausible and persuasive explanation of the impact of European colonial policies in African countries was presented by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and David Robinson (see "Disease and Development" Journal of European Economic Association, 1(2/3), pp. 397-405):

"European colonists were much more likely to develop institutions of private property, encouraging economic and social development, in places where they settled. In contrast, in places where they did not settle, they were more likely to opt for extractive institutions, designed to extract resources without investing in institutional development. In these places, institutions were highly centralized, with political power concentrated in the hands of small elites and with almost no checks on this elite. The property rights and more general rights of the majority of the population were not protected."

The political and economic circumstances of the European institutional legacy in African states imparted aid dependency on those countries where the combination of tribal institutions, hostile to free enterprise and judicial restraint of political dictatorships, and unequivocally detrimental colonial policies dominated the development of political and economic institutions, setting the rules of the game. Therefore, the inability of many African societies to establish sensible and effective institutions resulted in the political capture of the state by the elites. The monopoly power of the political elites, enforcing anti-growth public policies, led to consistently poor economic outcomes, plagued by high rates of poverty and infectious diseases such as polio, malaria and measles.

The challenge of development economics is not to design aid schemes, which inevitably lead to aid dependency, marred by persistent corruption and political fraud, but to ascertain correct diagnosis of why foreign aid repeatedly resulted in the poor economic outcomes and the consequent stagnation of income per capita in many African states in 20th century. The failure of African societies to establish a rigorous system of incentives, which could significantly improve economic outcomes, is not a response to market failures (which deemed highly of early development economics) but a result of severe government failure to establish effective institutions of the rule of law, contract enforcement and stringent property rights. These institutions are the broadest foundations of economic development and the only viable alternative to political nepotism and the power of elites which, as poor development outcomes in Africa show, ultimately impose extractive institutions, causing the persistence of poverty and underdevelopment.

Artificial states

The question of the artificial states has recently been brought up by the referendum in Southern Sudan on whether the southern part of the country should declare political independence from the northern part of the country. An article in New York Times (link) succintly discussed few notable fact-checked evidence of the increasing ethnic, political and economic North-South division within the country. As a single country, Sudan performed terribly in development outcomes. According to CIA World Factbook (link), the country suffers from high rates of extreme poverty and illiteracy. For instance, the official share of population below poverty line is estimated at 40 percent - almost twice the average of North African states. In addition to poor development outcomes, the country is plagued by significant political and ethnic fragmentation into largely Muslim, Arab-speaking north and predominantly Christain, English-speaking south. The political independence of South Sudan is the only contemporary evidence of the re-establishment of land borders alongside the ethnic division.

In the recent paper entitled Artificial States, Alberto Alesina, William Easterly and Janina Matuszeski presented two formal measures of artificial states. Aside from the measure of ethnic division, the authors constructed the measure of straightness of border lines. The hypothesis suggests that squiggly geographic border lines separate the states alongside the ethnic division. On the contrary, straight border lines suggest increase the probability of the emergence of artificial states plagued by ethnic and linguistic fractioning. The authors presented the empirical evidence, suggesting that fractional land borders are highly correlated with the GDP per capita. In addition, the share of ethnically partitioned population within the country is systematically decreasing the GDP per capita in cross-country comparison. The intuitive ideas behind the empirical evidence suggest that at the end of colonial period, colonizers that set straight borderlines between the emerging countries incured significant economic cost to newly formed African countries in terms of lost GDP. The evidence from Alesina-Easterly-Matuszeski study suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in the fraction of country's population belonging to groups partitioned by the border would decrease the GDP per capita by 1.3 percent. On the other hand, countries with squiggly geographic borderlines enjoy significantly higher GDP per capita.

The post-colonial period in Sudan was characterized by two civil wars which outbroke in 1972 and 1983. In 1956, Sudan gained the political independence from Great Britain. Contemporary borderlines were predominantly determined by the colonial authorities in African states prior to the wave of independence of many African nations. The emergence of the artificial states is rather a consequence of poor colonial policies than of high bargaining cost of ethnic groups within the country in setting country borderlines. Hence, the economic effects of colonial legacy can persist over time. Consider the evidence from Cameroon. The country was originally colonized by Germany. During the World War I, Northern Cameroon was occupied by Germany while the rest of the country was colonized by the French. Between 1916 and 1960, the country was a unique experiment of how the establishment of the institutional setting of European countries affects domestic development outcomes. A recent study by Alexander Lee and Kenneth Schultz (link) suggests that in the areas formerly occupied by the British enjoy higher levels of wealth and improved access to clean water while the rest of the rural country, after having been colonized by the French, suffers from significantly hindered access to clean water and worse provision of public goods. Even though the colonial patterns do not apply to urban areas, lessons from Cameroon suggest that the impact of post-independence public policies and colonial legacy on the level of wealth is of the same importance even when linguistic and ethnic fragmentation persists over time.

In spite of considerable degree of inefficiency, the persistence of inefficient and ethnically fragmented states is continuously marked by poor economic and development outcomes, often accompanied by civil-war conflicts such as military violence and genocide by the Sudanese army in Darfur. An interesting theory has been recently put forth by Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni (link) who suggest that rich political elites seize state capture and democratic politics by expanding the size of bureaucracy. Hence, to gain political support, the coalition of elites chooses an inefficient structure and organization of the state.

The phenomenon of artificial states is not abridged to least-developed countries and developing world. Even in the group of advanced countries, several countries emerged despite a considerable degree of linguistic, ethnic and cultural fractioning within country borders. The evidence from Switzerland suggests that a continuous transition to a peaceful and stable democracy is possible. Amid highly fragmented linguistic and cultural characteristics such as four official languages and the persistence of GDP per capita divergence between high-income German cantons and low-income French cantons, Switzerland is characterized by envious political stability and economic performance. The genuine feature of federal political system is a consistent fiscal decentralization such as jurisdictional competition between units within the federalized structure in various areas such as taxation, regulation, health care etc. Hence, a decentralized fiscal structure and division of powers require a limited federal government and a high degree of autonomy within the federation. Thus, despite a multilingual population, the Swiss model of federalism is marked by political stability, peace and prosperity.

The phenomenon of artificial states in advanced countries is not confined to Switzerland itself. What distinguishes the Swiss model of federalism from centralist political systems in its neighboring countries is a high degree of political autonomy in Swiss cantons. Competition between jurisdictions within the federation nonetheless generates different economic outcomes. However, the outcomes generated by jurisdictional competition preclude adverse effects caused by either state capture of democratic politics or redistributive taxation between jurisdictions. In Switzerland, cantons with favorable public policies such as low tax rates on labor and capital, sound regulation and competitive provision of health care, have enjoyed persistently higher levels of wealth compared to cantons in the rest of the country. Of course, the coexistence of diverse ethnic and lingual groups within the single state requires common values, integrated into formal institutions.

Contrary to common perception, the artificial state may not be characterized exclusively by ethnic and linguistic fragmentation. To a large extent, Germany and Belgium could be classifed as artificial states. In Belgium, Flemmish-speaking north of the country consistently outperformed French-speaking south on various indicators and outcomes, including income per capita, international test scores and employment-to-population ratio. The political and linguistic division of Belgium into high-income Flemmish part and less developed French part reflects the essential dilemma of artificial states - should a single country with fragmented and heterogenous population be abandonded and whether ethnicity borders should represent country borderlines. In fact, linguistic fragmentation of Belgium to the extent that Flemmish and French part of the country adopted different administrative and education systems, led to persistent inability of two majorities to form a government. In 2007, The Economist opined that Belgium should cease to exist. The unification of Germany (Wiedervereinigung) integrated two parts of the country with vastly different institutional setting into a single political unity. However, Eastern and Western Germany were known for completely different political and economic system. The unification has incured many adverse effects. A significant difference in wage and price levels between East Germany and West Germany caused continuous migration of East German labor into West Germany, thus decreasing the productivity growth in East Germany. Consequently, the unification of the country led to the adoption of West Germany level of prices and wages in Eastern part of the new country. The artificial increase in price-wage level increased the unemployment rate in Eastern Germany to double-digit level, not least triggered brain-drain and capital flight. Hence, the unification of Germany as an artificial state resulted in persistent income per capita divergence between high-income West Germany and low-income East Germany. The unification of Germany into a single country should indeed never happen. In fact, adverse effects of the unification on East German productivity and wages would not lead to continuous increase in unemployment rate. If East Germany maintained a high degree of political autonomy, the transition to market economy would not be restrained by the adoption of West German price-wage level that could not be sustained by low productivity level in East Germany. To avoid the pitfalls of the artificial states, West and East Germany would be better off, had the countries never been reunified.

Recent national referendum in South Sudan on whether the southern part of the country should declare political independence from Sudan again pondered over the persistence of artificial states. The empirical evidence on poor development outcomes in several African countries suggests that borderlines, disregarding the ethnic distribution of the population within the country, are highly correlated with low income per capita. The unique solution of the artificial states is the adoption of political federalism. Under fiscal decentralization and limited government, federalism enables peaceful and prosperous existence of fragmented ethnic and linguistic structure in a single state. For instance, former Yugoslavia, known for highly fragmented ethnic, linguistic and economic disparities, ceased to exist not because federalism would not be a genuine political system but, ultimately, because of severe economic mismanagement, powerful and centralized government that disdained the principles of political autonomy and market economy, causing severe hyperinflation and the collapse of the federation that eventually resulted in a decade of civil wars and military violence. The evidence from Yugoslavia suggests that between 1950 and 1990, drastic economic divergence occured. The lesson suggests that the essential condition for the efficiency of federalism as a political system is high political autonomy and fiscal decentralization, both of which enable the competition between public policies.

Amid linguistic fragmentation, the competition between jurisidictions rewards competitive public policies by higher income per capita which ultimately boost the inception of public policies in less developed parts of the federation. Hence, without jurisdictional competition and political autonomy, ethnic and linguistic fragmention of the country may ultimately result in political instability which, in addition, generates poor economic outcomes.

Student performance and economic growth

The 2009 PISA test study (link) of students' proficiency in reading, mathematics and science is a highly successful method of evaluating student performance across countries. In fact, the creation of human capital is the main endogenous feature of the long-run economic growth since the quality of schooling and education system are essential to the creation of human capital. The difference in GDP per capita across countries is both intuitive, theoretical and empirical challenge to search for the causes of the gap between the economic performance of nations.

PISA test scores are aimed mainly at the evaluation of student knowledge at primary and secondary level in the fields of reading, mathematics and science. The assessment of knowledge in a particular field is subdivided into six different proficiency levels, ranging from 1 to 6. For instance, students at the 1st reading proficiency level are characterized by innate recognition of simple ideas reinforced in the text while students at the 6th reading proficiency level are characterized by a full capability of making multiple inferences, comparisons and contrasts and integrating the ideas presented in the text into a coherent conceptual framework of abstract ideas, sound evaluation and reflection. While 98.6 percent of OECD students can perform reading tasks at level 1, only 1.1 percent of students across OECD countries can perform reading tasks at the highest proficiency level. In addition, 28.4 percent of students in OECD countries exceeded the 4th (mid-range) reading proficiency level.

The reading scale has been further divided in reading continuous and non-continuous texts. However, the evidence suggest no systematic difference in reading scores between the two fields. Countries with the highest performance, measured as mean score, in reading rank are Korea (89.8 percent), Finland (89.3 percent) and Canada (87.3 percent). Countries with the largest student populations such as United States, United Kingdom and France were ranked in the upper-middle range while percent, and Israel (79 percent), Luxembourg (78.6 percent) and Austria (78.3 percent) are the lowest-ranking high-income countries on the reading scale in the 2009 PISA assessment. In the field of mathematics, 8 percent of students in OECD countries perform below level 1, 31.4 percent of students can perform mathematical tasks at 4th (mid-range) proficiency level while 3.1 percent of students perform at the highest proficiency level. In the country distribution, the percentage of students in the 6th proficiency level is the highest in Korea and Switzerland (8 percent), Japan, Belgium and New Zealand (5 percent). In a regional distribution, more than 25 percent of students in Shanghai perform at the highest level of mathematical proficiency. The proportion of students in the 6th proficiency level is very high in Singapore, Chinese Taipei and Hong Kong - 15.6 percent, 11.3 percent and 10.8 percent respectively. In addition, performance disparity in mathematics varied significantly across countries. Less than 1 percent of students in Mexico, Chile, Greece and Ireland reached 6th proficiency level A brief overview of the main empirical findings suggests a rather rigorous disparities in country ranking and performance.

The assessment of student performance in science is similar to the distribution of mean scores in the field of mathematics. About 5 percent of students perform below 1st proficiency level. In addition, only 29.4 percent of the students in OECD countries is proficient at 4th (mid-range) proficiency level in science while an average 1.1 percent of students in OECD countries can perform at the highest level of scientific literacy. In addition, the percentage of students below the lowest level of scientific proficiency is highly negatively correlated with country ranking since the proportion of students below the 1st level is the lowest in Finland (8.3 percent), Korea (6.3 percent), Estonia (8.3 percent) and Canada (9.6). Higher country ranking would thus indicate a lower proportion of students below the 1st proficiency level. All of the aforementioned countries ranked in the highest 10 percent of the distribution. If Shanghai, Hong Kong, Macao and Taipei were independent countries, their respective ranking in the field of scientific literacy would be in the top 10 percent of the distribution.

The empirical data on the distribution of mean scores in reading, mathematics and science are highly relevant to the measurement of human capital since the impact of mean scores on economic growth would differ to the certain extent from other measures of human capital. Recent attempts to capture the effect of human capital on economic growth were aimed at the definition of human capital as total years of primary, secondary and tertiary schooling. For instance, Robert Barro and Jong Wha Lee have collected disaggregated data on the total years of schooling for 146 countries between 1950 and 2005 at five-year intervals (link). The empirical evidence from the country panel suggests a strong linkage between schooling and long-run economic growth and institutional country features (link). In addition, Barro and Lee estimated the implicit return from an additional year of schooling ranging from 5 percent to 12 percent.

Gary Becker (link) and Richard Posner (link) recently discussed the 2009 PISA findings and the impact of cultural, genetic and demographic disparities on mean test scores in the United States. United States ranked in the middle of the mean score distribution. The rank of the United States (17th out of 79 countries) is above average in reading and average rank in mathematics (31st out of 79 countries) and science (23rd out of 79 countries). As Becker and Posner indicate, the relative performance of the United States should be evaluated with the consideration of cultural and demographic differences since the mean score of White and Asian students is significantly higher than the mean score of African American and Hispanic students. Disparities in mean scores between different demographic groups are typical in largely heterogenous populations. In Belgium, the regional disparity in mean scores between French and Flemish communities is even more striking. While the mean score in mathematics in 2006 in Flemish community had beenabove the OECD average, the mean score in mathematics of students in French community had been 18.56 points below the OECD average while the mean score of students in Flemish community had been 30 points above the OECD average. In 2009, such a relative difference would place French community in the rank of Italy, Portugal and Spain. On the other hand, student performance in Flemish-speaking community would reach the rank of Canada, Switzerland and Japan.

In the U.S, the demographic disparities in mean scores in reading, mathematics and science do not reflect the quality of the American education system. While the overall quality of the public and private American high school education system raised considerable concerns in previous performance of U.S. students in international mathematics and science ranking, the ranking of U.S. universities in science, mathematics and social sciences is the highest in the world. The output U.S. universities resulted in the highest number of Nobel laureates in physics, chemistry, medicine and economics as well as into cutting-edge accomplishments in R&D and technology. The emphasis on creativity and innovative thinking embodied in the American education system has enabled the United States to emerge as a world leader in technology, R&D, innovation and entrepreneurship.

The openness of the U.S. education system to international students, ideas and creative thinking could account for the remarkable achievements and academic quality of top American universities. On the other hand, poor teacher quality in American high school system is detrimental to the reading and quantitative literacy of American high school graduates, as a consequence of what Becker calls "teaching-to-the-test" syndrom where many public school teachers teach students topics not relevant to the command of knowledge but to the tests since test scores presumably determine teacher pay. Eric Hanushek of Hoover Institution recently found (link) that replacing bottom 5-8 percent of high school teachers with average teachers could near the United States on top of the international mathematics and science ranking. In addition, the measure is worth $100 trillion according to Hanushek (2010).

In the international perspective, student performance has been viewed as a significant determinant of the difference in cross-country economic performance. Recent paper by Atherton, Appleton and Bleaney (2010) found that higher mean test scores in mathematics, reading and science significantly improve per capita GDP. The authors showed that holding per capita income constant, average years of schooling is less important than mean test scores in predicting the economic growth. The 2009 PISA study highlighted the relationship between international test scores and economic growth. The evidence suggests almost non-existent correlation between reading performance and GDP per capita and cumulative education expenditure. The evidence simply suggests that socioeconomic variables matter more for reading performance than simple and often inconclusive aggregate indicators. In analysing the impact of various social and economic variables on reading performance, the results suggest a high correlation between parents' education and children's reading performance. For instance, 1 percentage point increase in the percentage of the population aged 35-44 with tertiary education returns 1.36 point increase in average reading performance where parents' education accounts for 44 percent of the variation in children's reading performance. The impact is shown in the following graph.

Parents' education and student reading performance

Source: OECD, PISA 2009.

A brief look also reveals another striking implication: cross-country reading performance is strongly affected by social and cultural status of the child's parents. A simple estimate of the relationship between reading performance and socio-economic status suggests that 1 percentage point increase in the share of students with very low social, cultural and economic status tends to decrease the average reading score by 1.13 points. Hence, social, economic and cultural status explains about 46 percent of the variation in student reading performance.

A considerable improvement of primary and secondary education system is vitally essential to the long-run economic growth. International test scores are an important method of evaluating international disparities in student performance and the subsequent impact on economic growth. Modern knowledge-driven economy requires not only intelligence, attentiveness but also comprehensive, integrated and developed social skills. Low reading, mathematics and science performance is generally attributed to student's low social, cultural and economic status. Genetic, cultural and socioeconomic variables, rather than education expenditure and GDP per capita, tend to play a major role in early childhood development as a basis of future student performance.

The economic and social future of countries requires considerable investment in children and student. Professor James Heckman of the University of Chicago brilliantly argued in Heckman equation (link) why the most gainful benefit of early childhood development is increased social productivity, greater motivation and developmental stimulation that every child needs. Our society should be not neglect an indisputable fact that early childhood development is a major determinant of student performance which sets the conditions for future advantage in school, college, career and life in general. Without these essential measures, student performance would suffer heavily from the spread of crime, teenage violence and high dropout rates.

The evidence from the 2009 PISA study suggests that higher quality of the education system is a necessary condition for higher test scores in reading, mathematics and science. As the evidence suggests, that the quality of human capital is strongly associated with higher standard of living. Without a prudent step towards improving developmental stimulation of students, considerably low student performance may seriously harm the prospects of future generations.