KENNETH ROGOFF ON FINANCIAL CRISIS

Kenneth Rogoff of the Harvard University, former chief economist at the IMF, has drawn a perspective on current financial crisis (link) that boosted macroeconomic instability in the U.S and the rest of the world, facing surgining inflation rates (link), asset bubbles and declining output growth.

WHAT IS THE COST OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS

Inside Higher Ed published an interactive article about political correctness by discipline. The article can be read here.

LESSONS FROM MONETARY POLICY: 1930 AND 2007

Martin Feldstein (link) and Barry Eichengreen (link) offer a closer perspective on the comparison of the state of monetary policy at the beginning of the Great Depression and in the light of recent frictions in financial markets.

CLASSICAL LIBERALISM, PUBLIC CHOICE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF SLOVENIA

I recently listened the serie called "Intelekta" (link) on Radio Slovenia. The topics of the talk was classical liberalism and its direct and indirect effects on economic growth and development. Nobel laureate fromm 1973 and an imminent philosophical and economic thinker, Friedrich August von Hayek once famoulsy noted that society's course will be changed only by the change in ideas. Once ideas meet the minds of the individual initiative, the politico-economic measures will follow. Slovenia, still the wealthiest post-communist economy, enjoys moderately high standard of living while the future prospects of economic development are hampering the growth of output and productivity. My research (link) has shown an alarming evidence of Slovenia's score on economic growth and development: back in 1991, the relative gap in terms of standard of living between Slovenia and Estonia stood at 35-41 years, taking purchasing power parity and current prices into account. In 2007, the gap between Slovenia and Estonia reduced to 13 years. In simple terms, this implies that in 13 years, the level of living standard in Estonia will surpass the standard of living in Slovenia. In this briefing paper, I intend to draw a perspective on Slovenia's economic development and empirically alternatives to statist economic policy and Bismarckian welfare state.


The Empirical Side of Economic Policy

Back in early 1970s, David Nolan of the MIT, composed a chart, showing how each political ideology is derived from the mathematical treatment of marginal changes in two variables - personal and economic freedom. Today, this matrix is called Nolan chart (link). The usefulness of this matrix is of the high purpose since it can show revealed preferences of political parties as vote-maximizing agents in an oligopolistic political market. Kenneth Arrow, a Nobel-winning economist, devised an impossibility theorem, the assertion of which is that it is impossible to devise a constitution or voting system which offers more than two reasonable choices to the individual, or that will guarantee to produce a constant set of preferences for a group which correspond to the preferences of the individuals making up that group. Hence, the paradox of voting is that it is impossible to have rational and at the same time egalitarian choice. Assume a two-agent utility-maximizing model in the political market where both agents strive to maximize election output. Because both groups face a monotonic utility function, which means practically the same preferences under different set of policy measures, the empirical intuition is under what rules the agents will react. In Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow, proposed the rules of social choice (link). Unless clear rules are given in the game of economic policy, limiting the scope of government action, the use of discretion would always arise and be made permanent. This simple theorem referes to Arrow's general impossibility theorem and to the rules determining social choice. The behavior of utility-maximizing political agents is shown in the graph. The utility function y = u(x) is downward sloping. This movement reflects the fact that the first choice done by a political agent will inherently reduce the utility his competitor. It means that the support for one measure, say tax reform, will not be strong enough to pass it through. Each utility-maximizer in the political market will inevitably seek to maximize the utility sum of each square by reducing the utility of the competing agent per se. What determines the voting outcome is the rule of the margin - meaning that higher majority rule of one group will entail greater feasibility of social choice. From an empirical point of view, that could be the reason why political system with smaller number of utility-maximizing political agents tend to score higher on the scale of political freedom and quality of governance. In theoretical terms, the paradox of voting is that higher majority rule implies the full-scale fluidity of individual preferences transmitted into the machine of collective choice. Notably because individual preferences of choice can be fully processed only by the market mechanism, the collective choice always entails a contradiction in terms. Instead, it should be noted that transitivity and non-coercion are the main determinants of the welfare choice, not the aggregation of preferences.

Picture No.1: Political Competition and the Public Choice

Economic Theory and Policy: The Failure of Statism in Slovenia

After 17 years of transition from state-controlled to market-oriented economy, Slovenia is still the strongest economy in Central and Eastern Europe. A detailed view on the scoreboard of economic growth shows that throughtout 1990s, the overall growth of real productivity per head stagged compared to other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The real reason for rachitic growth of factor productivity is not the insufficient amount of working hours in the market but the size of tax burden. Until the latest minor change in tax rate structure, top marginal income tax rate was 50 percent. Even now, when the top rate on earned income is 41 percent, the rate structure is not inclined towards the growth of productive behavior such as investment, entrepreneurship and labor supply. Additional tax burden levied on workers and entrepreneurs, such as employee social security contribution and mandatory employer social security contribuion, has downsized the potential growth of overall productivity - which is, in all empirical and theoretical aspects, the main determinant of wage level. The unparalelled growth of the corporate state triangle of government, employer associations and trade unions - initiated a collective bargaining which still attempts to determine wages via central-planning mechanism that is not based upon market-clearing price system. The overall consequence of collective determination of wages is that the relative price of labor services is mis-allocated, causing labor shortages and surpluses. At the same time, that is the reason why real private-sector economy in Slovenia is facing labor shortages of skilled labor supply. True, brain-drain is another consequence of labor shortages because of high tax rates that hinder productivity growth and human capital utilization in the real sector. The lack of privatization is reflected in the fact that state control in the Slovenian economy is at the same share as Soviet Union under Lenin when the latter launched New Economic Policy (link). Considering the data, the share of private sector activities in the GDP is, in Slovenia, the smallest in the region. When the last comparison was published, public sector activities composed 35 percent of the GDP compared to the regional average of 20 percent. The most alarming threat to Slovenia's macroeconomic stability is the expected increase in net financial liabilities and transfers into inter-generational accounts through pension and health-care system. From a rational and sustainable perspective, capital market is the best guarantee of savings utilization for the old-age as the long-run sustainability of the rate of return on portfolio investments determines the level of old-age income, not transfers such as "pay-as-you-go" or income distribution that skews the productivity of the labor supply. When all aspects of statism are taken into the empirical and methodological account, it does not seem surprising why Slovenia's comparative economic performance stalled while other economies in the region, such as Slovakia and Estonia, faced significant rates of output growth. If Slovenia's long run output growth rate increased from 3,0 percent to 4 percent in the long run, the gap in the standard of living between Austria and Slovenia would shrink from 58 years to 22 years, ceteris paribus. Perhaps that is the best possible evidence that stable and free institutions, pro-growth economic and tax policy, limited government spending, free world trade, the absence of government intervention is superior to cradle-to-grave welfare state and economic policy based on government intervention. Adam Smith once wrote that "...the highest level of prosperity occurs when there is a free-market economy and a minimum of government regulation." So true.

Rok SPRUK is an economist.

THE MYTH OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS

Edwin M. Truman highlighted the revealed preferences of sovereign wealth fund establishment. The article can be read here.

GERMANY'S GDP DECLINED

German GDP contracted by 0,5 percent as reported by Financial Times (link):

"Germany’s economy contracted less than feared in the second quarter but the underlying pace of activity has still dropped sharply... Gross domestic product in Europe’s largest economy declined by 0.5 per cent in the three months to June, the country’s statistical office reported on Thursday. A fall had been expected after a surprisingly robust first quarter – when GDP rose by 1.3 per cent, according to the latest revised figures. But leaks from Berlin had suggested the drop could be as large as 1 per cent... Still, the underlying slowdown highlighted the impact of soaring oil prices in curbing global demand for German exports and reducing consumer spending. The latest contraction was the first for almost four years, the statistical office said... Germany’s weak performance is expected to drag down eurozone GDP figures due later on Thursday and which are expected to show the first quarterly contraction in the 15-country region since the launch of the euro in 1999. Concerns about recession – two quarters of negative growth – are now widespread across the eurozone. Earlier this month, Jean-Claude Trichet, European Central Bank president, warned that the second and third quarters would be “particularly week” and this week, Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, an ECB executive board member, said the period of weakness could be “protracted”. However some analysts warned against excessive pessimism. “The German economy is not likely to fall into recession in the third quarter. We expect a small rise in GDP with a rebound in private spending after the sharp decline in oil price,” said Sylvain Broyer at Natixis in Frankfurt."

ANOTHER EVIDENCE WHY EU FARM SUBSIDIES ARE DEADLY HARMFUL

EU Observer has recently quoted (link) the study conducted by a team of British scientists showing that, each year, farm subsidies on behalf of EU's common agricultural policy cause strong heart diseases and stroke-related deaths as a consequence of too high nutrition values per se, given the amount of fat that farm producers can use to produce food. This is an additional sign why EU's common agricultural policy is a roadmap in the wrong direction. Taking some basics of the microeconomic theory into account, we can see that EU farm subsidies lead to massive overproduction of milk and diary products simply because producers do not meet a sufficient amount of market information as a consequence of subsidy distortions. Again, subsidies can be attributed only if there is more negative neighborhood effects that the amount of positive ones while agricultural sector is a case study that would suffice the criteria for subsidy giving as there is a market-clearing price mechanism. World Health Organization revealed that EU's annual milk production subsidies amount 16 billion EUR, including a 500 million EUR butter consumption stimulus.

The EU Observer noted (link):

"Looking at the 15 EU states before the 2004 round of enlargement, the annual "mortality contribution attributable to CAP was approximately 9,800 additional CHD deaths and 3,000 additional stroke deaths within the EU," the study says, with France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK seeing the highest numbers of excess deaths."

Market liberalization and an immediate end of subsidizing agricultural production would certainly boost the shift towards consumer choice and demands. In turn, that would also bring positive neighborhood effects since producers' prices would be closer to marginal cost level which means that the severity of heart diseases and stroke-related deaths and consequences would disappear faster and easier. Frankly, it's about time to end the tyranny of EU's agricultural subsidies and CAP. The effect of farm subsidies revealed by British scientists are another strong argument and evidence of the mischief of subsidy-giving.

FED INTERVENTION

Allan H. Meltzer explains why Fed should be taken away from investment banks (link):

"So what can taxpayers expect from an increase in the Fed's discretionary authority over investment banks? The likely answer is rescues, delays and lax supervision – followed by taxpayer-financed bailouts. Throughout its postwar history, the Fed has responded to the interests of large banks and Congress, not the public. Investment banks don't need the Fed to regulate them. Some clear rules on capitalization would suffice."

THERE IS NOTHING WRONG WITH TAX HAVENS

One of the most interesting discussions among the economists and policy experts is a debate about the role of tax havens and offshore destinations that compete with other nations in the areas of taxes, regulation and investor protection. The opponents of tax havens believe that tax havens cause an enormous damage to the economies on the other side of the world since (in their opinion), tax havens are the fundamental reason for the lack of reinvestment and capital flight in onshore economies. The real reason why tax havens are prosecuted by governments is that governement agents seek the highest possible utility from tax revenues in the form of rent-seeking that would yield more power and revenue.

Taxes and Regulation

There are two reasons for high tax rates. One is that in case of high government spending, the structure of tax rates must be high enough to avoid excessive deficit spending that could impair domestic macroeconomic stability. First, the real threat to macroeconomic stability is not deficit but the size of government spending. Also, excessive deficit spending is a threat to domestic macroeconomic stability because of the so called crowding-out effect where high government spending crowds out investment in the private sector. The net outcome is higher interest rate that arises from an increased scarcity of investment that is caused by budget deficit and high government spending. Second, the basic assertion of the Laffer curve is that high tax rates produce a bulk of negative effect. For example, when Sweden had the highest marginal tax rate in the world excessing 80 percent, the net result had been a decreasing tax revenue and when marginal tax rate were reduced, tax revenue soared. However, the real aim of tax rate reduction is not the growth of government revenue but welfare and the right of taxpayers to use the disposable income they earn. Empirical evidence suggests that prudent macroeconomic discipline such as principles of low tax burden, limited spending and adherence of price stability by the central bank result in the improvement of conditions for economic growth and stabilization process regardless of asymmetric shocks. What about regulation? Government regulate for two reasons. First, to remove the negative effects of market imperfections and second, to insure public goods. However, predatory tax rates, the growth of tax burden and the regulation of the private sector are designed seek monopoly rents in an unregulated way. While sound regulation can certainly offset the sideblocks of negative externalities such as free-riding, excessive regulation is hampering the growth of real productivity which is essential to the standard of living and the quality of life.

Tax Havens

Dan Mitchell recently explained (link) the positive role of tax havens in a global economy. From a basic perspective, minimal tax burden in tax havens is a liberalizing force in the world economy since, given capital mobility and the fluidity of knowledge, destinations with higher corporate and personal income tax burden have no choice but to reduce tax rates on productive behavior. Flat tax revolution, that was initiated by Estonia in early 1990s, also helped reduce corporate tax rates in continental Europe and Scandinavia. Given the lack of data, there are hardly any empirical studies researching the impact of tax rate reductions on tax revenue. When Swedish economy faced an onerous macroeconomic instability marred by high inflation, low output growth, declining productivity growth and a sudden dramatic increase in the interest rate (to 500 percent overnight) by Riksbank, top marginal tax rate was 84 percent. Consequently, economic growth decline and public spending grew and shrank into deficit, pushing the real interest rate up, as explained by crowding-out effect (link). When the economy is on the line of potential output, expansionary fiscal policy boosted money demand which, in turn, induced the increase in the real and nominal interest rate. As a consequence, Swedish economy faced a declining investment. Firstly, because corporate tax rate was excessive and secondly, because crowding-out effect took place. Regarding tax havens, supply-side economic and tax policies induced the trend of lowering tax rates on all sources of productivity ranging from investment, savings and entrepreneurship to labor supply. Concerning regulation, high corporate tax rate and excessive regulation usually go hand in hand since the regulation of the private sector is mostly an implicit insurance against the loss of control and - hence - the loss of tax revenue that is needed to finance government spending.
Empirical observation

I took a closer view on the comparative analysis of tax havens and onshore jurisdictions that impose higher mandatory tax rates on corporate and personal income tax as well as more excessive regulation. I downloaded the data from World Bank's Governance (link) and used a correlation analysis tool to analyze related motions of corporate tax rate, the rule of law and regulatory quality on each of these variables. An important note is that it depends on what is meant by 'regulatory quality' since World Bank oftenly criticizes tax havens. Concerning governance, tax havens scored lower than Germany and Austria - countries with high and almost punitive corporate tax rate. Despite a shaddy and imperialist fiscal agression on Liechtenstein, Germany still enjoys an enormously high score on the rule of law and regulation. However, I did not take a detailed look at methodological details even though I can say that there are extreme bias towards what regulatory quality really is.

This chart, for instance, shows a log-linear relationship between corporate income tax and regulatory quality. Considering trend line - estimated by a polynomial of second degree, countries with higher corporate income tax also have sounder regulation. But, if you take a closer look, it can be seen that trend line declines slightly in the area where there is a high concentration of countries (France, Spain, Belgium, Germany...). From WB's data, a curious reasearcher would conclude that higher taxes are good and tax havens have a tighter regulatory quality. However, the relationship in the chart is intuitive since R-square is 0,0436 which means that the variation of the independent variable explains only 4,36 of the variation of the dependent variable.


This chart(log-linearization of the relationship between corporate tax rate and the rule of law) shows that countries with high corporate income tax rate also have comparatively decreased rule of law. Again, it all depends on what is meant under the rule of law. For example, if offshore services are legally recognized in Cayman Islands, and if World Bank's governance methodology treats that as irresponsible, then Caymans will receive a lower score on the rule of law. As you can see, Iceland has the highest rule of law and a modest corporate tax rate (16 percent down from 18 percent). Interestingly, Netherlands Antilles are a tax haven more in terms of regulation and information disclosure than in terms of taxes since 34 percent corporate tax rate seems to be highly sensitive to the rule of law. In fact, many so-called tax havens have a higher rule of law than continental countries. For instance, Cayman Islands have a higher rule of law than Spain, Singapore has a higher rule of law than Germany, Belgium and France etc.

As a conclusion, tax havens are the force of liberalization in the global economy and when surveys (such as WB's) are conducted, it's good to review the methodology and measurement of particular indicators. There are bias everywhere.

Rok Spruk is an economist.

IS SLOVENIA'S HEALTH-CARE SYSTEM SUSTAINABLE?

Institute for Economic Research in Health Care (INERHC) issued a thorough economic analysis and review of Slovenian health-care system (link). Previously, the institute issued a publication in which institute's experts analyzed the financial sustainability of government-mandated health-care system in Slovenia (link).

BEST PLACES FOR DOING BUSINESS

Forbes.com recently published its annual global research (link) on the attraction of particular countries on doing business from macroeconomic and microeconomic point of view. According to Forbes, the best place for doing business is Denmark, followed by Ireland, Finland, United States and United Kingdom. Among top 10 there are also Sweden, Canada, Singapore, Hong Kong and Estonia.

CDS IN ICELAND

In Forbes, there is a brief article (link) on credit default swap in Iceland in the wake of credit crunch and external shocks that affect macroeconomic stability.

LESSONS FROM ARGENTINA

THE QUALITY OF BUSINESS LOCATION: THE CASE OF SWISS CANTONS

Credit Suisse recently published a research paper (link) where it's been shown that Swiss cantons with lower tax burden and improved regulatory environment are therefore more attractive as locations for doing business (link). Cantons Zug, Zurich and Obwalden got the highest score. Although tax rate structure in Zurich is not among the lowest in entire Switzerland, Zurich's high score can be explained by the fact that there's a high-quality access to demand linkages that certainly boosts the quality of Zurich as business location despite relatively high personal and corporate tax rates. In more distant cantons, tax competition certainly plays a bigger role since creating a business environment friendly oriented towards incentives to work, save and invest is a primary tool that boosts the locational quality of the region regarding economic outlook and the quality of the particular environment for doing business.

KENNEDY TAX CUTS IN 1960s

Here is how JFK explained the benefits of tax reductions that he implemented in 1960s.

TAX RATE REDUCTION IN GIBRALTAR

Tax-news.com recently reported that Gibraltar's government eventually decided to slash the corporate tax rate from 33 percent to 12 percent by the beginning of 2010 (link).

ARGENTINA'S PUBLIC DEBT SHOT UP TO 56 PERCENT OF THE GDP

From FT:

"Argentina’s debt levels are now higher than they were when it crashed into the biggest sovereign debt default in history in 2001, and a worsening crisis of confidence in the government has brought the spectre of a new default closer, a report to be published next week says. Despite a radical restructuring just three years ago, public debt has reached $114.7bn (€74.4bn, £59bn), or 56 per cent of gross domestic product, compared with $144.2bn, or 54 per cent of GDP, in 2001 – at a time when Argentina’s economy was much larger – according to the paper. Martín Krause and Aldo Abram, directors of the Argentine Institutions and Markets Research Centre at Eseade business school and the report’s authors, also found that if the amount owed to bondholders who did not accept the 2005 restructuring and are suing to recover their money is included, Argentina’s overall debt rises to $170bn, or 67 per cent of GDP. “We’re not teetering on the brink of default but if we continue down this path, with this level of [social] conflict, we could get there,” Mr Abram told the FT. Many developed countries, including Italy and Japan, have higher ratios of debt to GDP but Argentina’s higher borrowing costs and rocky institutional record make it harder to secure credit. “The worry is not the amount, it’s that we won’t have access to credit,” Mr Abram said. The six-month-old government of Cristina Fernández, the president, has been struggling to resolve a conflict with farmers after it imposed a sliding scale of export tariffs on key agricultural exports in March. The unrest has spread to truck drivers, who have mounted roadblocks to demand an end to the farm dispute, which has disrupted grains transportation. Their action has caused fuel shortages and will put further pressure on inflation, which the government is widely accused of trying to conceal with doctored data. Meanwhile, the government must this year find $14.6bn for debt servicing, plus $11.8bn next year and $10.5bn in 2010. However, the threat of legal action by bond holdouts bars Argentina from international capital markets whilst it remains in default with the Paris Club of creditor nations, to which it owes $6.6bn. Argentina has increasingly turned to Hugo Chávez, the Venezuelan president, who has bought $6.4bn in bonds in the past three years. But its international financial isolation is costly – Buenos Aires has had to pay Venezuela interest rates of up to 13 per cent, yet it cancelled its low-cost International Monetary Fund debt and the Paris Club debt only costs 5.3 per cent, Mr Krause said. By contrast Brazil, which had a far worse debt profile than Argentina in 2001, recently achieved investment grade and sold a 10-year bond at 5.3 per cent."

PRICE CONTROLS DON'T SOLVE RELATIVE SCARCITY: THE CASE OF MEXICO

Financial Times reports that Mexican government decided to impose food price controls in response to an increase in food prices. It will be interesting to see the situation when the laws of supply and demand take place.

INFLATION IN ASIAN ECONOMIES

Financial Times has a brilliant analysis regarding inflationary pressures and the surgence of macroeconomic instability in Asian export-driven economies (here).

REGULATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Kevin Hassett of the American Enterprise Institute recently published in article (link) in which he explained why there is a negative correlation between high regulation of entry and entrepreneurship. Two economists, Silvia Ardagna and Annamaria Lusardi examined survey data collected from 150,000 individuals in 37 different countries and showed that the amount of opportunity entrepreneurs is the highest in countries where there is less regulation of entry. For example, the United States has the highest share (8 percent) of opportunity enterpreneurs and the fewest regulatory entry barriers, after Canada and Denmark. On the other side, Spain, France, Belgium and Slovenia have the lowest share of opportunity enterpreneurs and unsurprisingly many regulatory barriers of entry.