Bush tax cuts and economic growth

In 2001 and 2003, former U.S president George W. Bush signed Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act (EGTRAA) and Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRAA). EGTRAA reduced personal income tax rates, increased child tax credit, decreased estate tax and introduced a various range of tax-favored retirement savings plans. In 2003 when EGTRAA was enacted, the Congress cut the top capital gains tax rate from 20 percent to 15 percent while the individual dividend tax rate was reduced from 35 percent to 15 percent.

Bush tax cuts are set to expire in 2011. Hence, a bold increase in marginal tax rates is expected. David Leonhardt recently asked whether the Bush tax cuts were good for economic growth amid the fact that under Bush administration, the U.S economic growth was the lowest since the World War II. Eight years of Bush administration were known for the largest expansion of federal government spending compared to the six preceding presidents. In eight years, President Bush increased discretionary federal outlays by 104 percent compared to 11 percent increase under President Clinton.

Under Bush tax cuts, the reduction in personal income tax rates was imposed across all income brackets. Tax Policy Center estimated that extending Bush tax cuts in 2011 would increase the after-tax income across all income quintiles but it differed substantially. For instance, the increase in after-tax income in the lowest quintile would represent 12.19 percent of the increase in after-tax income of the highest quintile. The average federal tax rate would decrease by 2.5 percentage points. The reduction in average federal tax rate would be the most significant for top 1 percent and 0.1 percent cash income percentile, -3.8 percentage points and -4.4 percentage points respectively. Assuming the extension of the Bush tax cuts, the average federal tax rate, which includes indvidual income tax rate, corporate income tax rate, social security, Medicare and estate tax, would be substantially lower compared to Obama Administration's FY2011 Budget Proposal. The increase in the average federal tax rate would be roughly proportional across the cash income distribution. The federal tax rate would increase by 1 percentage point for the lowest quintile and 3.1 percentage point for the top quintile. The federal tax rate would for earners in top 1 percent of cash income distribution would increase by 4.2 percentage point. The chart shows the distribution of average effective tax rates and current law and current policy of Bush tax cuts not assumed to expire in 2011. The current proposal would increase the effective tax rate across all income quintiles. The highest increase (3.3 percentage points) would hit the earners in top 20 percent of income distribution.

Effective Tax Rates: A Comparison

Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model

The expiration of the Bush tax cuts would substantially increase the effective tax burden across the cash income distribution. Recently, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities estimated that letting the Bush tax cuts expire would create a net gain of $22 billion in economic activity. Hence, allowing high-income tax cuts expire would, on impact, result in a net gain of $42 billion in economic activity which is about five times the economic stimulus from extending high-income tax cuts.

The years of the Bush administration were earmarked by the escalation of federal government spending both in absolute and relative terms. The growth in federal government spending was driven mostly by discretionary defense spending while non-discretionary federal outlays increased as well. Since 2001, the federal government spending in the Bush administration increased by 28.8 percent with a 35.7 percent growth in non-defense discretionary spending. The growth of the federal government under Bush administration was the highest since the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon. The Independent Institute compared the growth of federal government spending from Lyndon B. Johnson onwards.

Letting the Bush tax cuts expire would probably not impose a negative effect on small businesses since less than 2 percent of tax returns in the top 2 income brackets are filed by taxpayers reporting small business. William Gale contends that the Bush tax cuts significantly raised the government debt. The economic consequences of the 9/11 and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were detrimental. William Nordhaus estimated that the total cost of war in Iraq between 2003 and 2012 could exceed $1 trillion in 2002 dollars considering unfavorable and protracted cost scenario. To a large extent, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have added substantially to the increase in government spending. However, even after excluding defense outlays from the spending structure, the increase in non-defense discretionary spending exceeded the growth of the federal government spending by 5.6 percentage points. Between 2000 and 2008, the number of federal subsidy programs increased from 1,425 to 1,804 - a 26 percent increase compared to 21 percent increase during Clinton years.

The Bush tax cuts failed to result in a Laffer curve effect mostly because they were implemented alongside a bold and significant increase in federal government spending. Had a substantial reduction in government spending been enforced, the tax cuts would not place should an enormous weight in the growth of federal debt. Higher federal debt would inevitably ponder the structural fiscal imbalance. Since debt interest payments would increase, a combination of tax cuts and spending growth would stimulate investment demand, creating an upward pressure on interest rates, especially during the economic recovery when the difference between potential output and real output is expected to diminish.

Critics of the Bush tax cuts often claim that cuts amassed a growing fiscal deficit. However, in 2007, the fiscal deficit stood at 1.2 percent of the U.S GDP while in 2009, the deficit increased to 9.9 percent of the GDP as a result of $787 billion fiscal stimulus from Obama Administration. Since tax cuts were enacted in 2001 and 2003 respectively, something else is to blame for the deficit.

U.S Federal Debt: Long-Term Forecast

Source: Office of Budget and Management; author's own estimate

The main premise of the economic policy of the Bush administration had been a significant increase in federal government spending. Spending policies were mostly aimed at covering the growing cost of the Iraqi war. In addition, domestic non-defense outlays on social security and domestic priorities grew significantly, creating an upward pressue on federal debt. The growth of entitlments such as Social Security and Medicare poses a serious long-term risk regarding the sustainability of federal government spending. In the upper chart built a simple forecasting framework to estimate the long-run level of U.S federal government debt as a percent of the GDP. Surprisingly, time trend accounts for 85 percent of the variability of the share of federal debt in the GDP. A more robust framework would include the lagged dependent variable and several regressors in the set of explanatory variables to increase the share of variance explained by independent effects of regressors. The results indicate that by 2020, the federal debt could easily reach the 90 percent thresold.

The growing stock of entitlements such as Social Security and Medicare are central to understanding the looming pressure on federal budget to tackle the challenges of ageing population and demand for health care. The tax cuts imposed by the Bush administration reduced average federal tax rates across quintiles in cash income distribution. However, tax cuts were no supplemented by the reduction in federal government spending. Consequently, the growth of federal government spending increased future interest debt payments and failed to take into account the long-term pressure of Medicare and Social Security on federal budget set. Extending the Bush tax cuts would be superior to letting them expire. But lowering tax burden should nevertheless be comprehended by the reduction in federal government spending.

THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SODA TAX

Greg Mankiw (link) and David Leonhardt (link) have opened a debate on whether govenrment policymakers should levy a tax on soda and other soft drinks as an attempt to reverse the growing trend of obesity among the U.S. population. The idea of taxing soda has become popular as governments around the world have recorded high budget deficits and revenue shortfall. The real question is what would be the effects of taxing soda and, if so, would the introduction of the tax contribute to the reversal of the obesity pattern, especially among the child population.

There is a decent amount of empirical studies and health policy analyses on the patterns and causes of obesity. Obesity and the risk of premature death resulted from high blood pressure and the potential heart attack is the most individual cost of fast-food consumption. For a long period of time, we assumed that these costs at the individual level could be internalizied and, thus, raise no cost to the society. In the article published in Sunday's edition of NY Times Greg Mankiw drew parallels between soda and tobacco tax. If individuals consume a lot of cigarettes at home, there is, presumably, no negative externality shifted onto the society. The logic could be applied to soda taxation. However, there is a flip side to the argument. Taxing soda, tobacco and other goods with a negative impact on bystanders is an answer to the growing cost of health care delivery to the individuals who consume these goods. The adverse impact levied on other individuals is seen through higher health insurance premiums and total cost of health care.

John Cawley published an extensive analysis of the causes of early childhood obesity (link), suggesting greater government intervention and various cost-effectiveness measures to mitigate the adverse impact of childhood obesity on other members of the society. A study by Jason M. Fletcher, Daniel Frisvold and Nathan Tefft (link) has been one of the first attempts to measure the effect of vending machines restriction on childhood obesity. The authors concluded by suggesting higher tax rates and soft drink access restrictions in schools to fight the on-going increase in childhood obesity.

As Kelly Brownell of Yale Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity mentioned, the link between sugary drinks and obesity is stronger than the link between obesity and any other kind of food (link). The evidence suggests that distance from fast-food restaurant is a significant feature of childhood obesity. A study conducted by Janet Currie et. al (2009) has shown that among children in the 9th grade, a fast-food restaurant within 1/10 of the mile in school is associated with at least 5.2 percent increase in obesity rates (link). The study found that the direct impact of distance from the fast-food restaurant is significantly larger for less educated African-American and less educated women.

The question is whether taxing soda and other kinds of fizzy drinks could potentially reduce and/or reverse the growing trend of obesity. The basic question to start with, is what is the elasticity of demand for soda drinks. The estimates suggests that price elasticity of demand for the majority of soda drinks ranges from -0.8 to -1.0. For example, -1.0 elasticity coefficient suggests that a 10 percent increase in the price of soda would - ceteris paribus - lead to 10 percent decrease in soda drink consumption. The price elasticity of demand for soda drink is relatively high considering that coefficients of price elasticity of demand for other kinds of food ranges from -0.2 to -0.5. If policymakers considered the introduction of a tax on soda consumption, the relevant question is who would bear the burden of the tax? Given elastic demand, the tax would be beared by consumers. However, high price elasticity of demand suggests that there is a widely availible range of close substitutes with potentially negative adverse effects for the individuals. So it is not unlikely that children would switch to other kinds of fast food with equally negative impact on obesity, blood pressure and quality of living.

Given the lack of experiments and availibility of household surveys, it is difficult to estimate the consumer response to the introduction of tax on soda. The estimate of price elasticity of demand suggests that part of the tax would be beared by the consumer. However, it also suggests that a change in the relative price of soda would induce children to consume other varieties of fizzy drinks. Experimental studies by health policy experts suggests different approaches to tackling the adverse impact of soda drinks and other kinds of fast food. The most notable approach is the restriction of vending machines in school districts. However, restricting the access to vending machines would encourage the consumption of fast food outside school districts. A general tax on soda would be preferable to the restrictions of access of vending machines. There is absolutely no doubt that a tax would discourage consumption of soda and other kinds of fast food. Estimates suggest that soda and other kinds of fast food such as hamburgers, donuts and cakes are complementary. Assume, the cross-price elasticity of demand for burgers is -0.9 Thus, if the price per unit os soda increases by 10 percent, the demand for donuts, burgers and cakes decreases by 9 percent (0.9×10 percent). Since a tax on soda would raise the relative price of soda, the consumption of these kinds of fast food would diminish, resulting in less adverse impact of fast food consumption on the individuals. I would disagree with the statement that negative externalities from soda and fast food consumption are internalized by the individual. For example, an article by Trasande, Liu, Fryer and Weitzman (2009) published in Health Affairs (link) investigated the annual cost of childhood obesity in the U.S. between 2001 and 2005, based on the nationally representative data from U.S. hospitals admissions. The authors found that from 1999 to 2005, obesity-related hospitalizations doubled. In addition, costs related to hospitalization, treatment and diagnosis of obesity increased from $125.9 to $237.6 million, an 88.7 percent increase. The cost is partly beared by Medicare while the rest of the total cost is beared by the private insurance premiums.

Given the perverse system of employer-provided health care and implicit subsidizing of health insurance suppliers by the federal government, the periodic increase in obesity-related health care costs indicates a further rise in Medicare expenditures and health insurance premiums. In such conditions, there is little incentive for children and parents to reverse the consumption of soda drinks and fast food. Taxing soda and complementary fast food is a step in the right direction. But it should be noted that the introduction of a tax on soda should be compensated by a corresponding decrease in personal income tax. However, without the parent-guided awareness of the adverse impact of fast food on obesity, it would be difficult to reverse the increasing pattern and cost of childhood and adult obesity. Therefore, much of the obesity-related health care risk in childhood can be solved within the household. It would be irrational and foolish to believe that a tax on soda and government paternalism could solve the obesity puzzle and mitigate its neighborhood effects on bystanders.

SLOW GROWTH AND PUBLIC DEBT IN EUROPE

Gary Becker (link) and Richard Posner (link) have initiated an interesting debate on low economic growth as the main macroeconomic concern of European economies in overcoming the increasing burden of public debt.

TAX WEDGE AND PRODUCTIVITY IN OECD COUNTRIES

The OECD Factblog highlighted a comparison of tax burden across the OECD countries. The main findings of the comparison is that overall tax burden, measured as a percentage of labor costs, is the highest in Western European countries. Belgium, Hungary, Germany and France are the countries with the highest overall tax burden while Ireland, Iceland, Australia and Korea have sustained low tax wedge. The data acquired by the OECD pose an intriguing question: is slow economic growth in European countries attributed to high tax burden of labor supply and, if so, has the gap between the U.S. and Europe grown further?

Let's decompose the data and underline the main findings. Tax wedge, measured as a percentage of taxes and transfers paid in the share of total labor costs, is a suficient measure of the overall level of taxation. In the analysis of the effect of taxation on labor supply, the economic theory distinguishes between substitution and income effect. The former means that tax rate on labor supply would reduce the number of working hours and shift the individuals to allocate more time into leisure. The income effect, on the other hand, states that the effect of tax on labor supply would be neutral and would, hence, not have an effect on the relative allocation of resources between working hours and leisure. In general, there are two largely opposing views in economic policy regarding the relationship between taxation and labor supply. Conservative and liberal economists tend to emphasize the role of incentives. Higher tax rate would raise the labor cost and the corresponding decline in wages would be offset by the re-allocation of resources into leisure sector of the economy. Left-wing economists mostly disagree with the abovementioned proposition. Instead, they emphasize the role of elasticity of labor supply. According to New Keynesian view, short-run tax elasticity of labor supply is low in absolute terms, meaning that the amount of working hours does not respond significantly to relative changes in tax rates. The Keynesian economists thus emphasize the significance of income effect while the conservative and liberal economists tend to emphasize the substitution effect. The distinctions and policy effects of these two theoretical propositions remains a controversial issue of economic policy debate.

The country distribution data is extensively underlined in the data (link). For example, one-earner married couple at 100 percent of earnings distribution is taxed at 20 percent of the overall labor cost in the United States, 22 percent in Australia, 18 percent in Switzerland and 13 percent in New Zealand. On the other tax wedge statistics for Western Europe is a completely different picture. In Sweden, one-earner married couple at 100 percent of earnings distribution will earn only 57 percent of net earnings, indicating a 43 percent effective tax rate on labor supply. In Belgium, the effective tax rate on labor supply is 42.6 percent. Is the difference in effective tax rates statistically significant feature of productivity variation across OECD countries. The OECD recently composed a breakdown in key productivity statistics in developed countries (link). To estimate the relationship between productivity and tax burden, I collected data on multifactor productivity dynamics from Groningen Growth and Development Center (link) and data on tax wedge across OECD countries (link). I estimated the noted relationship for 16 developed OECD countries. Multifactor productivity is a dependent variable while tax wedge is an explanatory variable.The estimates are displayed on the graph below.

Multifactor productivity in OECD relative to the U.S. and total tax burden (% of labor cost)

Source: GGDC, OECD Factblog

The horizontal line on the graphs marks the U.S. level of multifactor productivity. As the graph shows, the underlying relationship between multifactor productivity (MFP)and tax wedge is fitted with quadratic equation. Total tax wedge explains about 34.5 percent of the variation in multifactor productivity index across OECD countries. The trend exerts a decreasing MFP as the tax wedge rises and, after reaching a local minimum, a slight increase alongside the proporional rise in tax wedge. The relevant question is at which rate of tax wedge the MFP reaches the minimum. Setting the first-order derivate to zero (dy/dx=0) yields 0.0016x-0.0488=0. Rearranging the equation yields x=30.5. The first-order derivative implies that MFP reaches the minimum at 30.5 percent tax wedge. The estimate sample-based tax elasticity of productivity ((dy/dx)(x/y)) is 1.78. The elasticity indicates that 1 percentage point increase in tax wedge would reduce the multifactor productivity in a sample country by 1.78 percent, ceteris paribus. In other words, the estimated slope coefficient suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in tax wedge would widen the MFP gap between the average country and the US by additional 0.05 index points.

In economic terms, MFP would decrease as long as the countries in the sample would exert less than 30.5 percent tax wedge. In the horizon after the local minimum (30.5 percent), MFP would initially increase but at a smaller rate than before the function would reaches the minimum point. At 20 percent tax wedge (close to Japanese level), the expected decrease in MFP would be 0.0168 index point. At 40 percent tax wedge, the expected increase in MFP would be 0.0152 index point. Economically, the relationship between MFP and tax wedge should not be interpreted as a mixed effect of tax wedge on MFP. In countries, where tax wedge exceeds 30.5 percent (Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium etc.) , the multifactor productivity is close to the U.S. level. The only country with higher MFP level than the United States is Luxembourg. In these countries, the average number of annual hours worked per worker is lower than in the U.S. Hence, hourly productivity output is higher. The following graph illustrates the relationship between annual hours worked (per worker) and MFP level.

Average annual hours worked per worker and multifactor productivity relative to the US

Source: OECD Statistics (2010)

As the graph illustrates, there is a negative relationship between average annual hours worked and MFP. The estimated regression coefficient suggests that an increase in annual hours worked by 100 hours would reduce MFP level (compared to the U.S) by 0.06 index points. As expected, the implied elasticity of productivity is negative. Taking the average values ov both variables, an increase in average annual hours worked (per worker) by 1 percent would reduce the MFP relative to the U.S level by 1.16 percent, ceteris paribus.

The conclusion is that there is a significant and negative impact of tax wedge on multifactor productivity. Taking the differences in annual hours worked into account, tax wedge alone explains almost 35 percent of the differential in multifactor productivity across the OECD. The findings suggest that there is a relatively strong substitution effect in labor supply. The finding is underlined by the fact that higher tax wedge would correspondingly reduce annual hours worked. However, the interpretation should be taken with a grain of warning. As previous empirical studies have shown, there is a widespread disparity in the distribution of working hours in formal and household sector of the economy. A sizeable proportion of working hours in household sector of the economy is not officially measured. Consequently, a blick of distortion of the real relationship between labor supply and tax wedge, in its broadest sense, is a major impediment to the measurement of labor supply dynamics. These estimates will, in a large part, determine the future research of the effect of taxation on labor productivity.

WHAT EASTERN EUROPEAN TIGERS CAN TEACH WESTERN EUROPE

In yesterday's edition of WSJ, Johnny Munkhammar and Nima Sanandaji wrote a well-argued dissussion (link) on how Eastern Europe's advantage in terms of competitive tax rates, low tax burden and sizeable reform efforts in emerging from the crisis offer a great lesson for economic recovery of the Western counterparts.

LOWER CORPORATE TAX RATE IN ONTARIO

Chris Edwards, an economist at the Cato Institute, reports that Tim Horton's (Canada's "Starbucks") is moving its headquarters to Ontario, as the provincial policymakers are cutting the federal-provincial corporate tax rate down to 25 percent (link). That is 15 percentage points lower than the federal corporate tax rate in the U.S.

TWO INTERESTING READINGS

Earlier this morning, I came across the latest release of data on the distribution of federal taxes and household income, published by the CBO (link) and a fascinating lecture of Peter R. Orszag on the role of immigration in the U.S labor market (link).

THE NONSENSE OF DEATH TAX

Art Laffer discusses some negative implications of death tax in WSJ (link).

FRANCE'S ENORMOUS TAX BURDEN

WSJ reports that French president is under pressure of labor unions to raise taxes on the wealthy as an act of solidarity (link). Meanwhile, France's economy deteriorated significantly in the light of recession and turmoil of the financial crisis. The economy is expected to decline by 1,9 percent in 2009 on the annual basis. The forecasting prospect for French economy in 2010 is also a little grimmy. The IMF expects 0.7 percent economic growth in 2010 (link). The stagnation of France has been diagnosed as a consequence of high tax burden, inefficient and oversized public sector and rigid labor markets which hinder productivity growth and further deteriorate the already unsustainable social security and pay-as-you-go pension system when net financial liabilities increase exponentially in the share of the GDP. The OECD has shown an interesting comparison (link) of tax burden on labor supply in OECD countires. France, Belgium, Hungary and Germany are in the top ladder of tax burden on labor supply, where tax burden on average workers is very close or above 50 percent of labor cost while the OECD average is slightly below 40 percent.

FISCAL POLICY IN ECONOMIC CRISIS

A new study by IMF (link) suggests a framework for fiscal policy during recessionary periods. IMF admits that discretionary fiscal policy could further deteriorate economic recovery, increasing budget deficits and public debt which already reached new heights in G20 countries (link). It also suggets that vulnerabilities from financial markets should be addressed in preventing economic downturns. Agreeably, IMF does not suggest an introduction of large-scale entitlement programs which are politically almost impossible to reverse as well as an increase in public sector bill that could downsize productivity performance and exert a growing pressure on cost inflation. The study also concludes that industry-specific subsidies are harmful and could escalate protectionism. The study, however, does not recommend lower corporate tax rate, saying that tax reduction is likely to be ineffective leading to tax fraud. Numerous empirical studies have shown that high corporate tax rate is the primary reason for tax evasion, pushing private sector to move to jurisdictions with lower tax rates. And second, it would be suspicious to claim that corporate tax cut is ineffective because business profits are low. It is true that corporate tax reductions lead to higher tax multiplier and exert strong upward pressure during expansionary period, but that does not mean that corporate tax cut is ineffective during recessions. In fact, cutting taxes during recession eases the economic downturn as well as the pace of the recovery.

DENSITY OF TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP IN OECD 1960-2007

Here (link) is the availible data on density of trade union membership in OECD between 1960 and 2007. The membership in trade unions has been declining. In 1960, in the United States, 30.9 percent of the employees were engaged in trade union activities. In 2007, only 11.6 percent of employees were members of trade unions. Similar trendline occured in the UK, where the peak in trade union membership was 51,8 percent of the employees in 1978. From 1978 to 2007, trade union membership decline significantly. In 2007, it reached 28 percent of the workforce. In Canada, trade union membership was reversed in 1982 when it reached 36,8 percent of employees. In 2007, 29.4 percent of the working population were engaged in trade union activities. Compared to the U.S, trade union membership in Canada remained fairly steady throughout the period.

There is many empirical evidence arguing why trade union membership declined. In the U.S and UK, the reversal in trade union membership began in 1978 while in the U.S, the entire postwar period encountered a declining trend in trade union membership with a marked exception between 1975 and 1979 when Carter administration fostered pro-union policy measures.

In the UK, Thatcher's economic reforms, nicely summarized by Sir Alan Walters (link), aimed at the deregulation of the labor market which set a natural disincentive for union membership and, at the same time, stimulated productivity growth and reduced unit labor cost resulted from an excessive taxation of personal income and levies such as employer social security contributions. In 1978, for instance, the United Kingdom's overall productivity was 69 percent of the U.S productivity, down from 75 percent in 1960. In 1979, the marginal tax rate could reach as high as 98 percent, composed from 83 percent top tax rates and 15 percent tax surcharge on unearned income.

In continental Europe, trade union membership also declined significantly, showing a positive correlation between productivity growth a declining union membership although the continental European trade unions maintained a strong political power in collective bargaining as well as in economic policymaking. Not surprisingly, the output per capita gap between the U.S and Europe widened, starting in 1970s.

ANOTHER ATTACK ON TAX HAVENS

A campaign against tax havens has been launched by the British PM (link).

FLAT TAX IN BELARUS

Belarus is another Eastern European economy joining the flat tax club. The Ministry of Finance has proposed the shift from progressive tax system (with 35 percent top tax rate) to 12 percent flat tax rate. Recently, Financial Times discussed (link) the state of Belarussian economy, focusing essentially on liberalization prospects, tax reform and regulatory reform. According to WB's Doing Business, Belarus's business climate is more favorable after liberalization efforts were endorsed (link).

TAX MISERY 2008

Forbes recently published 2008's Tax Misery Index (link).

INCOME TAX RATES ARE FALLING, BUT NOT IN SLOVENIA

The newest study by the KPMG surveyed tax rates on individual income around the world (link). The study finds that average top rate on individual income is less than 29 percent. In Slovenia, it is 41 percent (link).

CUTTING TAXES, FALLING POVERTY

Art Laffer and Stephen Moore offer a brilliant evidence on how lower tax rates expanded income increases (here):

"The new Census Bureau data on income and poverty reveal that many of the economic trends in this country are a lot more favorable than America's detractors seems to think. In 2007, overall real median family income increased to $50,233, up $600 from 2006. The real median income for intact families -- mother and father in the home -- rose to $78,000, an all-time high. Although incomes fell sharply in the U.S. after the dot-com bubble burst in 2000 (and still haven't fully recovered), these latest statistics reflect a 25-year trend of upward economic mobility. More important, Barack Obama is wrong when he states on his campaign Web site that the economic policies started by Ronald Reagan have rewarded "wealth not work." Based on this false claim -- that the rich have benefited by economic growth while others have not -- he intends to raise tax rates on high-income individuals. To be sure, there has been a massive amount of wealth created in America over the last 25 years. But tax rates were cut dramatically across the income spectrum, for rich and poor alike. The results?
When all sources of income are included -- wages, salaries, realized capital gains, dividends, business income and government benefits -- and taxes paid are deducted, households in the lowest income quintile saw a roughly 25% increase in their living standards from 1983 to 2005. (See chart nearby; the data is from the Congressional Budget Office's "Comprehensive Household Income.") This fact alone refutes the notion that the poor are getting poorer. They are not...Looking at the last two business cycles (first year of recovery to first year of recovery), this low-income group experienced a 10% rise in their inflation-adjusted after-tax incomes from 1983 to 1992 and then another 11% rise from 1992 to 2002). Roughly speaking, the Reagan and Clinton presidencies were equally good for them. Income gains over the last 30 years have been systematically understated due to several factors. These include:
- Fall in people per household. The gains in household income undercount the actual gains per person, because the average number of people living in low-income households has been shrinking. On a per capita basis, the real income gain for low-income households was 44% from 1983 to 2005, about 22% from 1983 to 1992 and about 18% from 1992 to 2002. These are excellent numbers by any measure. Earned income tax credit effect. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a government payment to low income people who work. It was instituted on a small scale in 1975. In 1986, 1990, 1993 and 2001, Congress expanded the program ...Over time the EITC has multiplied the number of poor households that fill out tax forms each year and are thus counted in government income statistics. That's because to be eligible to receive the refundable EITC, a tax return must be filed ...Official tax return data show that in 1983, 19% of returns had zero tax liability; that percentage has climbed steadily, reaching 33% in 2005. (The Tax Policy Center estimates that in 2008 nearly 40% of filers will have no income tax liability.) Thus, we are now statistically counting more poorer families today than we used to. This is a major reason that median and poor household income gains appear to be a lot smaller than they have been in reality. Income mobility. In the U.S., people who had low incomes in 1983 didn't necessarily have incomes as low a decade later. People in this country have long moved up over time, and this income mobility continues to be true. While some people do remain in the lowest income group, they are the exception ...One way to quantify income mobility is to examine how many people remain in the same tax bracket over time. We compared the returns of tax filers in the lowest tax rate bracket (zero) in 1987 with their returns in 1996. Only one third of the tax filers were still in the zero tax bracket, but 25% were now in the 10% bracket, 32% had moved up to the 15% bracket and 9% were in the 25%, 28%, 33% or 35% brackets. And that was following them for a decade, not a generation ... From 1996 to 2005, we have the income mobility data for income quintiles. Of those filers who were in the lowest 20% in 1996 and who also filed in 2005, 42.4% remained in the bottom 20%, 28.6% were in the next highest quintile, 13.9% were in the middle quintile, 9.9% were in the second highest quintile, and 5.3% were in the highest quintile ...What is also striking about the data is that the poor today are, in general, not the same people who were poor even a few years ago. For example, the new Census data find that only 3% of Americans are "chronically" poor, which the Census Bureau defines as being in poverty for three years or more. Many of the people in the bottom quintile of income earners in any one year are new entrants to the labor force or those who are leaving the labor force. Obviously, there is also a significant core of truly poor people in this group, but that core is drastically less than 100%.
The data also show downward mobility among the highest income earners. The top 1% in 1996 saw an average decline in their real, after-tax incomes by 52% in the next 10 years.
America is still an opportunity society where talent and hard work can (almost always) overcome one's position at birth or at any point in time. Perhaps the best piece of news in this regard is the reduction in gaps between earnings of men and women, and between blacks and whites over the last 25 years ...Census Bureau data of real income gains from 1980 to 2005 show the rise in incomes based on gender and race. White males have had the smallest gains in income (up 9%), while black females have had by far the largest increase in income (up 79%). White females were up 74% and black males were up 34%. Income gaps within groups are rising, but the gaps among groups are declining. People are being rewarded in today's economy based on what they know and what they can do, not on the basis of who their parents are or the color of their skin ...There are of course Americans who live in poverty, as there are very affluent Americans with $25 million yachts and $10 million homes who hold ostentatious $200,000 birthday parties. But the evidence is plain that all groups across the income distribution have made solid gains during the last generation ... Taking from the rich through much higher tax rates in order to help the poor and middle class makes no sense intellectually and has seldom worked in practice. Reducing rates, on the other hand, does increase the share of taxes paid by the highest income-earning group. For example, in 1981, when the highest tax rate on the rich was 70% and the top capital gains tax rate was close to 45%, the richest 1% of Americans paid 17% of total income taxes. In 2005, with a top income tax rate of 35% and capital gains at 15%, the richest 1% of Americans paid 39%.
We suspect that Mr. Obama will discover that when you put "tax fairness" ahead of economic progress, you produce neither."

TAX CUTS IN EUROPE

Forbes reports (link) that Hungarian Prime Minister announced the abolition of 4 percent solidarity tax, a unique layer of tax on company profits that used to finance government's welfare expenditures. In addition, the government announced a decrease in corporate tax rate from 18 percent to 16 percent and payroll tax rate by 10 percentage points. However, after Slovenia and Croatia, Hungary is among the last remaining economies in Central-Eastern Europe without flat-rated income tax (link) that would boost economic growth, investment and job creation. Surprisingly, Greece introduced a gradual reduction in corporate and individual income tax by 5 percentage points over the next five years (link).

THERE IS NOTHING WRONG WITH TAX HAVENS

One of the most interesting discussions among the economists and policy experts is a debate about the role of tax havens and offshore destinations that compete with other nations in the areas of taxes, regulation and investor protection. The opponents of tax havens believe that tax havens cause an enormous damage to the economies on the other side of the world since (in their opinion), tax havens are the fundamental reason for the lack of reinvestment and capital flight in onshore economies. The real reason why tax havens are prosecuted by governments is that governement agents seek the highest possible utility from tax revenues in the form of rent-seeking that would yield more power and revenue.

Taxes and Regulation

There are two reasons for high tax rates. One is that in case of high government spending, the structure of tax rates must be high enough to avoid excessive deficit spending that could impair domestic macroeconomic stability. First, the real threat to macroeconomic stability is not deficit but the size of government spending. Also, excessive deficit spending is a threat to domestic macroeconomic stability because of the so called crowding-out effect where high government spending crowds out investment in the private sector. The net outcome is higher interest rate that arises from an increased scarcity of investment that is caused by budget deficit and high government spending. Second, the basic assertion of the Laffer curve is that high tax rates produce a bulk of negative effect. For example, when Sweden had the highest marginal tax rate in the world excessing 80 percent, the net result had been a decreasing tax revenue and when marginal tax rate were reduced, tax revenue soared. However, the real aim of tax rate reduction is not the growth of government revenue but welfare and the right of taxpayers to use the disposable income they earn. Empirical evidence suggests that prudent macroeconomic discipline such as principles of low tax burden, limited spending and adherence of price stability by the central bank result in the improvement of conditions for economic growth and stabilization process regardless of asymmetric shocks. What about regulation? Government regulate for two reasons. First, to remove the negative effects of market imperfections and second, to insure public goods. However, predatory tax rates, the growth of tax burden and the regulation of the private sector are designed seek monopoly rents in an unregulated way. While sound regulation can certainly offset the sideblocks of negative externalities such as free-riding, excessive regulation is hampering the growth of real productivity which is essential to the standard of living and the quality of life.

Tax Havens

Dan Mitchell recently explained (link) the positive role of tax havens in a global economy. From a basic perspective, minimal tax burden in tax havens is a liberalizing force in the world economy since, given capital mobility and the fluidity of knowledge, destinations with higher corporate and personal income tax burden have no choice but to reduce tax rates on productive behavior. Flat tax revolution, that was initiated by Estonia in early 1990s, also helped reduce corporate tax rates in continental Europe and Scandinavia. Given the lack of data, there are hardly any empirical studies researching the impact of tax rate reductions on tax revenue. When Swedish economy faced an onerous macroeconomic instability marred by high inflation, low output growth, declining productivity growth and a sudden dramatic increase in the interest rate (to 500 percent overnight) by Riksbank, top marginal tax rate was 84 percent. Consequently, economic growth decline and public spending grew and shrank into deficit, pushing the real interest rate up, as explained by crowding-out effect (link). When the economy is on the line of potential output, expansionary fiscal policy boosted money demand which, in turn, induced the increase in the real and nominal interest rate. As a consequence, Swedish economy faced a declining investment. Firstly, because corporate tax rate was excessive and secondly, because crowding-out effect took place. Regarding tax havens, supply-side economic and tax policies induced the trend of lowering tax rates on all sources of productivity ranging from investment, savings and entrepreneurship to labor supply. Concerning regulation, high corporate tax rate and excessive regulation usually go hand in hand since the regulation of the private sector is mostly an implicit insurance against the loss of control and - hence - the loss of tax revenue that is needed to finance government spending.
Empirical observation

I took a closer view on the comparative analysis of tax havens and onshore jurisdictions that impose higher mandatory tax rates on corporate and personal income tax as well as more excessive regulation. I downloaded the data from World Bank's Governance (link) and used a correlation analysis tool to analyze related motions of corporate tax rate, the rule of law and regulatory quality on each of these variables. An important note is that it depends on what is meant by 'regulatory quality' since World Bank oftenly criticizes tax havens. Concerning governance, tax havens scored lower than Germany and Austria - countries with high and almost punitive corporate tax rate. Despite a shaddy and imperialist fiscal agression on Liechtenstein, Germany still enjoys an enormously high score on the rule of law and regulation. However, I did not take a detailed look at methodological details even though I can say that there are extreme bias towards what regulatory quality really is.

This chart, for instance, shows a log-linear relationship between corporate income tax and regulatory quality. Considering trend line - estimated by a polynomial of second degree, countries with higher corporate income tax also have sounder regulation. But, if you take a closer look, it can be seen that trend line declines slightly in the area where there is a high concentration of countries (France, Spain, Belgium, Germany...). From WB's data, a curious reasearcher would conclude that higher taxes are good and tax havens have a tighter regulatory quality. However, the relationship in the chart is intuitive since R-square is 0,0436 which means that the variation of the independent variable explains only 4,36 of the variation of the dependent variable.


This chart(log-linearization of the relationship between corporate tax rate and the rule of law) shows that countries with high corporate income tax rate also have comparatively decreased rule of law. Again, it all depends on what is meant under the rule of law. For example, if offshore services are legally recognized in Cayman Islands, and if World Bank's governance methodology treats that as irresponsible, then Caymans will receive a lower score on the rule of law. As you can see, Iceland has the highest rule of law and a modest corporate tax rate (16 percent down from 18 percent). Interestingly, Netherlands Antilles are a tax haven more in terms of regulation and information disclosure than in terms of taxes since 34 percent corporate tax rate seems to be highly sensitive to the rule of law. In fact, many so-called tax havens have a higher rule of law than continental countries. For instance, Cayman Islands have a higher rule of law than Spain, Singapore has a higher rule of law than Germany, Belgium and France etc.

As a conclusion, tax havens are the force of liberalization in the global economy and when surveys (such as WB's) are conducted, it's good to review the methodology and measurement of particular indicators. There are bias everywhere.

Rok Spruk is an economist.

TAX RATE REDUCTION IN GIBRALTAR

Tax-news.com recently reported that Gibraltar's government eventually decided to slash the corporate tax rate from 33 percent to 12 percent by the beginning of 2010 (link).

CUTTING THE CORPORATE TAX BURDEN

Greg Mankiw (link) recently wrote an article (link) published in The New York Times (link) discussing the possibility of a cut in the corporate tax rate as recently proposed by the economic advisers of John McCain. While John McCain has some doubtful and economically questionable proposals, such as the extension of gas-tax holidays, his economic advisers recently proposed a cut in the federal corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 25 percent. While the suggested proposal has been harshly criticized by economists such as Brad DeLong (link), the proposal deserves an open discussion about the consequences of the corporate tax rate.

The most frequent mistake that has been grasped repeatedly by the mainstream media and intellectual elites is that corporate tax is actually paid by the corporation itself. Despite the soundness of the argument, it is false. Corporations are likely to be tax-collectors than taxpayers. Why? For example, if you own equities and securities, than corporations shift the burden to consumers, hired labor and stockholders. An increase in the corporate tax rate potentially reduces capital investment. In turn, a corporation levies the burden by cutting total costs of labor and services. Consequentially, corporate equities and stocks are hampered by a higher relative weight on potential returns. Also, a significant amount of empirical research, including Randolph's 2006 study (Congressional Budget Office), has confirmed that the major share (70 percent) of the corporate tax burden is beared by the labor force. Researchers at Oxford University (Arulampalan, Devereux, Maffini) examined the effect of the corporate tax in 50,000 European companies in nine European countries. They found that, in the long run, a $1 increase in the tax bill reduces the real wage at the median by 92 cents.

The opposition to the cut in corporate tax rate often includes arguments such as the loss of tax revenue and the reduction of real wages. However, none of these arguments is based on empirical observations. In the short run, there are numerous static assumptions claiming that the revenue may fall precisely. However, the reduction in corporate tax burden would result in a stronger and less volatile stock market. In turn, that would boost capital investment respectively which would lead to higher productivity growth. A basic consequence of productivity increase is the increase in real wages and a drop in consumer prices. True, part of rhe revenue loss may be covered by an increase in other taxes such as gasoline taxes. But have there been any confident estimates showing that the revenue may really decline?

An additional and truly important measure to decrease the corporate tax burden is lowering government expenditure, both in absolute in relative terms. According to experience, the net effect of lower government spending is an increase in the growth of real productivity as well as stronger stock market that would boost investment and reduce volatility of the stock market itself. Also, lower government spending would result in higher output growth as well as it would have significantly positive welfare effects on prices, wages and employment.