Thursday, November 12, 2009
U.S DOLLAR AND RESERVE CURRENCIES
The Economist published an excellent analysis on the future of reserve currencies in the world (link).
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
ECONOMIC COST AND BENEFITS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION
Yesterday, it has been 20 years since the fall of the Berlin wall and the eventual collapse of communist political and economic system in Central and Eastern Europe. However, there is still discussion about economic costs and benefits of German reunification (Wiedervereinigung). I've been motivated to open this debate by professor Becker's analysis (link) on the size of countries and by the recent article in Financial Times by the contributing German economist (link).
Economists in Germany and the rest of the world have long warned against the consequences of the unification of East and West Germany. After the unification, German central bank set the exchange rate at 1:1. Because East German workers' relative productivity level lagged far behind the West German level, East German workers migrated to West Germany in search of higher wages. When wage rates between West and East Germany were equalized in the absence of productivity catch-up in East Germany, the excess labor supply in the East led to high unemployment and slow changes in the economic structure. As the exchange rate was equalized and wages prevented from the natural adjustment to productivity growth, the unemployment soared as East German manufacturing sector couldn't employ labor anymore. The unemployed received massive transfer payments which, even more than a decade after the reunification, still present about 4 percent of total German income.
Today, the figures suggest that East German GDP per capita is roughly 70 percent of the Western German level and the unemployment rate exceeds 12 percent - more than twice the Western level. Low population density and high share of rural population are the main structural obstacle to higher productivity growth in the East. The majority of models in economic geography and urban economics suggests that agglomeration economies occur where population density is high. The latter yields significant advantages in terms of spillovers, search cost, factor mobility, know-how and economies of scale. Low population density is a major obstacle in attracting investment mostly because firms are not eager to locate at the periphery in the presence of high search costs and in the absence of high-skilled labor, agglomeration and linkages to economies of scale. In the U.S, for instance, Pittsburgh's industrial restructuring from resource-based steel industry into knowledge-intensive information technology, biotechnology and software development required agglomeration which combined high-skilled labor, human capital, access to regional and international markets as well as high population density.
In Germany, for example, Hamburg generated the highest GDP per capita (€51,000) among cities and Bavaria (Bayern) generated the highest GDP per capita (€36,000) among German states. Hamburg and Munich, as well as the linking cities located in their vacinity are among the most densely populated areas which enabled them to develop core industries, spillovers, know-how and dynamic knowledge externalities. There is an overwhelming evidence that differences in population density are a good source of growth difference between east and west Germany.
After the unification, German fiscal policymakers favored an expansive fiscal policy which directed federal expenditures into poorer regions of the East to boost the development of infrastructure. However, at an exchange rate 1:1, West German firms were reluctant to invest in East Germany mainly because of higher relative price of labor. As East German workers moved to the Western part of the country, west German firms hired eastern workers. As brain drain became widespread, the convergence of east German income per capita slowed.
East Germany were far better off, if the country remained independent. The reunification of Germany would yield singificant economic benefits, if the unification itself were based on close economic integration with the establishment of free trade area and free movement of capital, goods and labor. If East Germany remained independent and retained its own currency without the uncovered exchange rate realignment to to West German exchange rate parity, the relative price of East German labor wouldn't increase and thus the unemployment rate would be significantly lower than it has been ever since the reunification. Thus, West German firms would easily find attractive investments in East Germany. The process would dramatically reduce disparities in population density compared to the West. Under such scenario, East Germany's macroeconomic stabilization and institutional reforms would be a lot easier and the overall economic and political transition much less painful.
Economists in Germany and the rest of the world have long warned against the consequences of the unification of East and West Germany. After the unification, German central bank set the exchange rate at 1:1. Because East German workers' relative productivity level lagged far behind the West German level, East German workers migrated to West Germany in search of higher wages. When wage rates between West and East Germany were equalized in the absence of productivity catch-up in East Germany, the excess labor supply in the East led to high unemployment and slow changes in the economic structure. As the exchange rate was equalized and wages prevented from the natural adjustment to productivity growth, the unemployment soared as East German manufacturing sector couldn't employ labor anymore. The unemployed received massive transfer payments which, even more than a decade after the reunification, still present about 4 percent of total German income.
Today, the figures suggest that East German GDP per capita is roughly 70 percent of the Western German level and the unemployment rate exceeds 12 percent - more than twice the Western level. Low population density and high share of rural population are the main structural obstacle to higher productivity growth in the East. The majority of models in economic geography and urban economics suggests that agglomeration economies occur where population density is high. The latter yields significant advantages in terms of spillovers, search cost, factor mobility, know-how and economies of scale. Low population density is a major obstacle in attracting investment mostly because firms are not eager to locate at the periphery in the presence of high search costs and in the absence of high-skilled labor, agglomeration and linkages to economies of scale. In the U.S, for instance, Pittsburgh's industrial restructuring from resource-based steel industry into knowledge-intensive information technology, biotechnology and software development required agglomeration which combined high-skilled labor, human capital, access to regional and international markets as well as high population density.
In Germany, for example, Hamburg generated the highest GDP per capita (€51,000) among cities and Bavaria (Bayern) generated the highest GDP per capita (€36,000) among German states. Hamburg and Munich, as well as the linking cities located in their vacinity are among the most densely populated areas which enabled them to develop core industries, spillovers, know-how and dynamic knowledge externalities. There is an overwhelming evidence that differences in population density are a good source of growth difference between east and west Germany.
After the unification, German fiscal policymakers favored an expansive fiscal policy which directed federal expenditures into poorer regions of the East to boost the development of infrastructure. However, at an exchange rate 1:1, West German firms were reluctant to invest in East Germany mainly because of higher relative price of labor. As East German workers moved to the Western part of the country, west German firms hired eastern workers. As brain drain became widespread, the convergence of east German income per capita slowed.
East Germany were far better off, if the country remained independent. The reunification of Germany would yield singificant economic benefits, if the unification itself were based on close economic integration with the establishment of free trade area and free movement of capital, goods and labor. If East Germany remained independent and retained its own currency without the uncovered exchange rate realignment to to West German exchange rate parity, the relative price of East German labor wouldn't increase and thus the unemployment rate would be significantly lower than it has been ever since the reunification. Thus, West German firms would easily find attractive investments in East Germany. The process would dramatically reduce disparities in population density compared to the West. Under such scenario, East Germany's macroeconomic stabilization and institutional reforms would be a lot easier and the overall economic and political transition much less painful.
BUBBLES AND MACRO RISK
Frederic Mishkin says not all bubbles are a threat to the economy (link):
"Nonetheless, if a bubble poses a sufficient danger to the economy as credit boom bubbles do, there might be a case for monetary policy to step in. However, there are also strong arguments against doing so, which is why there are active debates in academia and central banks about whether monetary policy should be used to restrain asset-price bubbles.
But if bubbles are a possibility now, does it look like they are of the dangerous, credit boom variety? At least in the US and Europe, the answer is clearly no. Our problem is not a credit boom, but that the deleveraging process has not fully ended. Credit markets are still tight and are presenting a serious drag on the economy..."
EUROPEAN ANTITRUST POLICY
From The Economist (link):
"Nevertheless, it is unclear how a transatlantic row can be avoided along the lines of the spat in 2001, when a planned merger between General Electric and Honeywell caused a stink. The commission worries that a union between Oracle and Sun would reduce competition in the market for corporate databases. Oracle is the world’s biggest seller of proprietary software to run such databases, with a market share of nearly 50%. Sun is the owner of MySQL, the most widely used “open-source” database software, which already competes with Oracle’s products and could become more of a threat in the future. Neelie Kroes, Europe’s competition commissioner, spoke of her “serious concerns” that the deal would reduce choice and lead to higher prices."
"Nevertheless, it is unclear how a transatlantic row can be avoided along the lines of the spat in 2001, when a planned merger between General Electric and Honeywell caused a stink. The commission worries that a union between Oracle and Sun would reduce competition in the market for corporate databases. Oracle is the world’s biggest seller of proprietary software to run such databases, with a market share of nearly 50%. Sun is the owner of MySQL, the most widely used “open-source” database software, which already competes with Oracle’s products and could become more of a threat in the future. Neelie Kroes, Europe’s competition commissioner, spoke of her “serious concerns” that the deal would reduce choice and lead to higher prices."
RUSSIA'S ROAD TO ECONOMIC RECOVERY
Russia's recessionary contraction has been marked with several distinct features. First, capital account deteriorated significantly. In Q3:2009 it posted a $23.7 billion deficit, reflecting net capital outflows as a result of recovery uncertainties, exchange rate and oil price volatility and the inability of the Russian banking sector of debt repayment. Thus, net capital flows to the private sector decreased by 31.5 percent in Q3:2009.
During the economic crisis of 2008/2009, Russian fiscal policymakers increased government spending when the output gap was positive. Thus, from the mid-2008 onward, Russia faced high inflation rate which peaked well over 10 percent level. Even the fiscal outlook remains sluggish. In 2009, the non-oil government deficit is expected to reach between 11.0 and 12.5 percent of the GDP. The dynamics government deficit remains deteriorating until 2012. In 2010, the non-oil balance is expected at -14.20 percent of the GDP. In 2012, the balance is likely to improve by 1.40 percentage points from 2011. The decline of oil demand has rapidly eroded Russia's reserve fund earnings which decreased from 10.3 percent of the GDP in 2008 to 4.1 percent in 2009. Before the financial crisis, Russia's economic growth model was based mainly on fiscal policy reforms, confluence of high oil prices and access to external financing at low benchmark interest rates. The World Bank estimated that Russia's real GDP will return to pre-crisis level in late 2012. In the long term, Russia's growth quality will be improved only by more dynamic diversification of the economic basis, bold structural, governance and institutional reforms, trade openness, higher productivity growth and liberalized financial sector.
Russia's Macroeconomic Outlook
Source: Central Bank of Russia, Ministry of Finance, Bloomber
*denotes preliminary estimates
Economic Growth in Russia, Central and Eastern Europe and Advanced Economies
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2009
During the economic crisis of 2008/2009, Russian fiscal policymakers increased government spending when the output gap was positive. Thus, from the mid-2008 onward, Russia faced high inflation rate which peaked well over 10 percent level. Even the fiscal outlook remains sluggish. In 2009, the non-oil government deficit is expected to reach between 11.0 and 12.5 percent of the GDP. The dynamics government deficit remains deteriorating until 2012. In 2010, the non-oil balance is expected at -14.20 percent of the GDP. In 2012, the balance is likely to improve by 1.40 percentage points from 2011. The decline of oil demand has rapidly eroded Russia's reserve fund earnings which decreased from 10.3 percent of the GDP in 2008 to 4.1 percent in 2009. Before the financial crisis, Russia's economic growth model was based mainly on fiscal policy reforms, confluence of high oil prices and access to external financing at low benchmark interest rates. The World Bank estimated that Russia's real GDP will return to pre-crisis level in late 2012. In the long term, Russia's growth quality will be improved only by more dynamic diversification of the economic basis, bold structural, governance and institutional reforms, trade openness, higher productivity growth and liberalized financial sector.
Russia's Macroeconomic Outlook
Source: Central Bank of Russia, Ministry of Finance, Bloomber*denotes preliminary estimates
Economic Growth in Russia, Central and Eastern Europe and Advanced Economies
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2009
U.S ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOK IN 2009/2010
The latest macroeconomic data from major world economies suggested that the recessionary contraction is likely to be ended in the light of positive news on GDP growth and midterm macroeconomic outlook. However, the road of the economic recovery remains uncertain. The policymakers responded to the great contraction of 2008 by decreasing interest rates close to zero rate. Massive injections of monetary stimulus boosted liquidity and attempted to accelerate credit expansion. However, monetary stimulus such as TARP in the U.S encouraged excess reserves. Thus, the banking sector published significant quarterly results as the stimulus package covered the overall losses from the credit crunch and subprime mortgage crisis of the previous year. In this brief article, I outline the economic recovery in the U.S in the ongoing year.
In Q3, the U.S economy grew by 2.4 percent despite the negative unemployment figures. While the U.S productivity grew by 6.8 percent in Q2:09 and by 9.8 percent in Q3:09, the unemployment rate is expected to reach 10.5 percent in December. The $787 billion stimulus from Obama administration to the ailing industries did little to prevent the fallout of demand and the financial difficulties of many firms. In fact, most of the stimulus has not already been spent. In spite of enormous fiscal emergency aid, the Obama administration effectively nationalized the auto industry as Detroit's auto industry declared bankruptcy. The auto industry is likely to recover gradually. Eventually, the fall of Detroit's giants was more likely a consequence of auto industry's inability to cope with high labor cost and fringe health and pension benefits.
The underlying economic theory and evidence teach that massive government intervention in the economy is inefficient as if government bailout hadn't occured. In Q3:09, financial industry posted significant quarterly earnings. Monetary stimulus inflated another asset bubble which translated into highly prospective annual data and higher volatility. Morgan Stanley's annual stock return currently stands at 133.4 percent (link). On the other hand, stock markets rallied in the light of significant quarterly earnings of the banking and financial sector. In one year, Dow Jones Industrial Average grew by 18.27 percent (link), S&P 500 increased by 22.16 percent (link) while Nasdaq Composite's annual growth rate stands at 36.91 percent (link). Stock markets rallied in the light of favorable earnings projections and cost reductions.
On the macroeconomic level, the U.S economy is likely to face a long L-shaped recovery. The underlying conditions are extremely low interest rate, high unemployment rate and high quarterly productivity growth rate. Much of the confidence in fiscal stimulus and expansionary fiscal policy was based on the initial assumption that spending multipliers will exceed 1 and boost short-term output and investment to reduce the negative output gap. Nevertheless, fiscal policy outlook remains sluggish and the prevailing evidence suggests that spending multipliers are hardly positive, except for when the unemployment rate exceeds 12 percent, causing a major fallout of capacity utilization. Robert Barro and Charles Redlick recently estimated the cost of fiscal stimulus. The Obama administration has already expressed commitment to raising the marginal tax rates. Tax increases are the unfortunate midterm alternative because excessive borrowing and the estimated 9.9 percent of the GDP fiscal deficit in 2009 (link) has already downgraded sovereign U.S debt outlook. Redlick and Barro showed that one-period lagged increase in the average marginal tax rate reduces, GDP growth by 0.56 percentage point. The overall effect on consumption purchases is -0.29 and the overall effect on investment is -0.35, both statistically significant at 99 percent.
The U.S dollar further depreciated against the euro (link), increasing the U.S inflation rate above the expected target, partly as a result of the increase in short-term yield on Treasury bonds. Purchases of Treasury bonds effectively increased demand for U.S dollars and triggered short-term depreciation trend. An effective reduction of fiscal deficit in the coming years is a necessary condition for mitigating the negative effects of U.S current account deficit. As fiscal deficit raises demand for imports in the U.S, real depreciation of the real effective exchange rate raises relative prices in the tradable sector compared to non-tradable sector. The main highlights of U.S economy recovery will be focused on restrictive fiscal policy and policy interest rates. Zero interest ground is a real disadvantage in economic recovery, mainly because the negative output gap and the Fed is likely to face hard time trading-off between higher inflation if interest rates remains at historic lows while the real sector's credit demand could surge and potential output contraction in the coming quarterly periods if the Fed will raised targeted federal funds rates. In the latter scenario, the U.S economy could repeat the Japanese disease from the 1990s, being faced with long, sluggish and slow economic recovery that could last for several years.
In Q3, the U.S economy grew by 2.4 percent despite the negative unemployment figures. While the U.S productivity grew by 6.8 percent in Q2:09 and by 9.8 percent in Q3:09, the unemployment rate is expected to reach 10.5 percent in December. The $787 billion stimulus from Obama administration to the ailing industries did little to prevent the fallout of demand and the financial difficulties of many firms. In fact, most of the stimulus has not already been spent. In spite of enormous fiscal emergency aid, the Obama administration effectively nationalized the auto industry as Detroit's auto industry declared bankruptcy. The auto industry is likely to recover gradually. Eventually, the fall of Detroit's giants was more likely a consequence of auto industry's inability to cope with high labor cost and fringe health and pension benefits.
The underlying economic theory and evidence teach that massive government intervention in the economy is inefficient as if government bailout hadn't occured. In Q3:09, financial industry posted significant quarterly earnings. Monetary stimulus inflated another asset bubble which translated into highly prospective annual data and higher volatility. Morgan Stanley's annual stock return currently stands at 133.4 percent (link). On the other hand, stock markets rallied in the light of significant quarterly earnings of the banking and financial sector. In one year, Dow Jones Industrial Average grew by 18.27 percent (link), S&P 500 increased by 22.16 percent (link) while Nasdaq Composite's annual growth rate stands at 36.91 percent (link). Stock markets rallied in the light of favorable earnings projections and cost reductions.
On the macroeconomic level, the U.S economy is likely to face a long L-shaped recovery. The underlying conditions are extremely low interest rate, high unemployment rate and high quarterly productivity growth rate. Much of the confidence in fiscal stimulus and expansionary fiscal policy was based on the initial assumption that spending multipliers will exceed 1 and boost short-term output and investment to reduce the negative output gap. Nevertheless, fiscal policy outlook remains sluggish and the prevailing evidence suggests that spending multipliers are hardly positive, except for when the unemployment rate exceeds 12 percent, causing a major fallout of capacity utilization. Robert Barro and Charles Redlick recently estimated the cost of fiscal stimulus. The Obama administration has already expressed commitment to raising the marginal tax rates. Tax increases are the unfortunate midterm alternative because excessive borrowing and the estimated 9.9 percent of the GDP fiscal deficit in 2009 (link) has already downgraded sovereign U.S debt outlook. Redlick and Barro showed that one-period lagged increase in the average marginal tax rate reduces, GDP growth by 0.56 percentage point. The overall effect on consumption purchases is -0.29 and the overall effect on investment is -0.35, both statistically significant at 99 percent.
The U.S dollar further depreciated against the euro (link), increasing the U.S inflation rate above the expected target, partly as a result of the increase in short-term yield on Treasury bonds. Purchases of Treasury bonds effectively increased demand for U.S dollars and triggered short-term depreciation trend. An effective reduction of fiscal deficit in the coming years is a necessary condition for mitigating the negative effects of U.S current account deficit. As fiscal deficit raises demand for imports in the U.S, real depreciation of the real effective exchange rate raises relative prices in the tradable sector compared to non-tradable sector. The main highlights of U.S economy recovery will be focused on restrictive fiscal policy and policy interest rates. Zero interest ground is a real disadvantage in economic recovery, mainly because the negative output gap and the Fed is likely to face hard time trading-off between higher inflation if interest rates remains at historic lows while the real sector's credit demand could surge and potential output contraction in the coming quarterly periods if the Fed will raised targeted federal funds rates. In the latter scenario, the U.S economy could repeat the Japanese disease from the 1990s, being faced with long, sluggish and slow economic recovery that could last for several years.
Tuesday, November 10, 2009
MINIMUM WAGE AND OBESITY
David O. Meltzer and Zhuo Chen explored the relationship between minimum wage rate in the U.S and body weight (link):
"Growing consumption of increasingly less expensive food, and especially “fast food”, has been cited as a potential cause of increasing rate of obesity in the United States over the past several decades. Because the real minimum wage in the United States has declined by as much as half over 1968-2007 and because minimum wage labor is a major contributor to the cost of food away from home we hypothesized that changes in the minimum wage would be associated with changes in bodyweight over this period. To examine this, we use data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System from 1984-2006 to test whether variation in the real minimum wage was associated with changes in body mass index (BMI). We also examine whether this association varied by gender, education and income, and used quantile regression to test whether the association varied over the BMI distribution. We also estimate the fraction of the increase in BMI since 1970 attributable to minimum wage declines. We find that a $1 decrease in the real minimum wage was associated with a 0.06 increase in BMI. This relationship was significant across gender and income groups and largest among the highest percentiles of the BMI distribution. Real minimum wage decreases can explain 10% of the change in BMI since 1970. We conclude that the declining real minimum wage rates has contributed to the increasing rate of overweight and obesity in the United States. Studies to clarify the mechanism by which minimum wages may affect obesity might help determine appropriate policy responses."
"Growing consumption of increasingly less expensive food, and especially “fast food”, has been cited as a potential cause of increasing rate of obesity in the United States over the past several decades. Because the real minimum wage in the United States has declined by as much as half over 1968-2007 and because minimum wage labor is a major contributor to the cost of food away from home we hypothesized that changes in the minimum wage would be associated with changes in bodyweight over this period. To examine this, we use data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System from 1984-2006 to test whether variation in the real minimum wage was associated with changes in body mass index (BMI). We also examine whether this association varied by gender, education and income, and used quantile regression to test whether the association varied over the BMI distribution. We also estimate the fraction of the increase in BMI since 1970 attributable to minimum wage declines. We find that a $1 decrease in the real minimum wage was associated with a 0.06 increase in BMI. This relationship was significant across gender and income groups and largest among the highest percentiles of the BMI distribution. Real minimum wage decreases can explain 10% of the change in BMI since 1970. We conclude that the declining real minimum wage rates has contributed to the increasing rate of overweight and obesity in the United States. Studies to clarify the mechanism by which minimum wages may affect obesity might help determine appropriate policy responses."
OUTLOOK FOR THE NORWEGIAN ECONOMY
Norges Bank has recently published Monetary Policy Report 3/2009 (link) and a comprehensive list of figures and charts including major macroeconomic trends in Norway and abroad (link). Time series on unit labor cost, output gap and other macroeconomic indicators are interesting to observe, especially because Norges Bank has been the first central bank in Europe to announce a targeted increase in interest rate to mitigate midterm inflationary outlook. Here (link) is a closer look at NIBOR and monthly interest rate dynamics in Norway (link).
Friday, October 16, 2009
ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Eric Maskin offers a comprehensive insight into financial crisis from the perspective of the economic theory (link)
Monday, October 12, 2009
NOBEL PRIZE IN ECONOMICS 2009
This year's Nobel prize in economics goes to Elinor Ostrom and Oliver E. Williamson (link). Elinor Ostrom received the prize for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons while Oliver E. Williamson received the prize for his contributions to the economic governance, emphasizing the boundaries of the firm and its role in conflict resolution and case bargaining.
Michael Spence, the 2001 Nobel prize winner, briefly summarized (link) the main contributions of Elinor Ostrom and Oliver E. Williamson to the economic theory.
Michael Spence, the 2001 Nobel prize winner, briefly summarized (link) the main contributions of Elinor Ostrom and Oliver E. Williamson to the economic theory.
Saturday, October 03, 2009
THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STIMULUS SPENDING
Robert Barro and Charles Redlick wrote an op-ed in WSJ (link) on their original paper (link) where they discuss the macroeconomic effects of fiscal stimulus and construct long-term time-series on U.S macroeconomic data to examine whether real GDP increases follows the spending multipliers and whether reductions in marginal tax rates, rather than spending increases, tend to exert a stronger effect on GDP growth.
"Our research also shows that greater weakness in the economy raises the estimated multiplier: It increases by around 0.1 for each two percentage points by which the unemployment rate exceeds its long-run median of 5.6%. Thus the estimated multiplier reaches 1.0 when the unemployment rate gets to about 12% ... For data that start in 1950, we estimate that a one-percentage-point cut in the average marginal tax rate raises the following year's GDP growth rate by around 0.6% per year. However, this effect is harder to pin down over longer periods that include the world wars and the Great Depression."
"Our research also shows that greater weakness in the economy raises the estimated multiplier: It increases by around 0.1 for each two percentage points by which the unemployment rate exceeds its long-run median of 5.6%. Thus the estimated multiplier reaches 1.0 when the unemployment rate gets to about 12% ... For data that start in 1950, we estimate that a one-percentage-point cut in the average marginal tax rate raises the following year's GDP growth rate by around 0.6% per year. However, this effect is harder to pin down over longer periods that include the world wars and the Great Depression."
Wednesday, September 30, 2009
THE ECONOMICS OF UNIONS
Gary Becker (link) and Richard Posner (link) opened a discussion on how unions influence policymaking decision. Recently, president Obama imposed punitive 35 percent tariff rate on imported Chinese tire (link) risking the coming trade war. Indeed, China may file a case against the U.S at the WTO, and the WTO may rule against the U.S for imposing illegal and discriminatory trade practices.
Many believe that president Obama enforced trade protection to win the support of the unions in health care reform. In fact, the bailout of GM and Chrysler was one of the major efforts to help unions, particularly the United Auto Workers, in paying the health-care and pension benefits that GM and Chrysler couldn't actually afford to pay.
Recently, the Congress has been split up on Employee Free Choice Act which suggests giving mandate to unions representing employee in arbitrating union-management contracts. I believe the Congresional Budget Office will yield a meaningful research on the economic effects of the act.
The empirical evidence on union activity is, in fact, quite clear. In OECD comparison panel (link), there is a strong, negative and significant relationship between the density of union membership and labor market rigidity. Sweden, for example, hasn't enforced a general level of minimum wages. Yet in 2007, over 7o percent of the working population was unionized. High union density further contributed to inflexible labor market structure which led to low employment growth, low productivity growth and exerted a strong upward pressure on real labor cost.
Yet, there is a distinctive character of trade unions within Europe. Traditionally, unions in Europe possessed a stronger influence on political decision in areas such as taxation, income redistribution and government size. However, there are significant disparities in union activity throughout Europe. In 1990s, Denmark enforced a series of reforms that deregulated labor market structure towards greater flexibility. Today, Denmark's labor market is cited as the most competitive in the world (link). From 1990 to 2007, union density decreased from 75.3 percent to 69.1 percent. On the other side, labor market structures in Continental and Mediterranean Europe are known for inflexible features, regulation and rigidity. Meanwhile, Anglo-Saxon countries, Britain and Ireland, are known for flexible labor markets and few barriers impeding labor market performance. Dismissing and employee costs 10 weekly salaries in Ireland compared to 56 weekly salaries in Spain.
Although variation in trade union density over time explains a relatively large part of variation in productivity, union activity and influence in political decision-making could be the decisive factor in explaining cross-country variation in labor market outcome. That would requiring the design of principal indicator that could measure union influence on the quantitive basis. The influence of trade unions has, in my opinion, a strong common connection to cultural patterns and informal institutions.
For instance, countries with weak rule of law, persistent corruption, high tax burden and barriers to trade and investment, tend to have larger underground economies. Empirical estimates on the size of underground economies suggest that, in Europe (link), Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal) have the largest share of shadow economies. There is a significant cross-country variation. The estimates of shadow economies for 28 transition countries is 40.1 percent and 16.3 percent for the OECD. So, could union activity affect the size of shadow economies
If unions, as an interest group, exert a strong influence in politics, their political philosophy will probably lean left. Thus, if unions influence decisions on taxation issues, welfare benefits, pension schemes and government size, the outcome will probably induce more complexity, more regulation and more barriers to trade, entrepreneurship and investment. The combination of those factors can strongly influence labor and business incentives and, hence, also determine and productivity growth.
Many believe that president Obama enforced trade protection to win the support of the unions in health care reform. In fact, the bailout of GM and Chrysler was one of the major efforts to help unions, particularly the United Auto Workers, in paying the health-care and pension benefits that GM and Chrysler couldn't actually afford to pay.
Recently, the Congress has been split up on Employee Free Choice Act which suggests giving mandate to unions representing employee in arbitrating union-management contracts. I believe the Congresional Budget Office will yield a meaningful research on the economic effects of the act.
The empirical evidence on union activity is, in fact, quite clear. In OECD comparison panel (link), there is a strong, negative and significant relationship between the density of union membership and labor market rigidity. Sweden, for example, hasn't enforced a general level of minimum wages. Yet in 2007, over 7o percent of the working population was unionized. High union density further contributed to inflexible labor market structure which led to low employment growth, low productivity growth and exerted a strong upward pressure on real labor cost.
Yet, there is a distinctive character of trade unions within Europe. Traditionally, unions in Europe possessed a stronger influence on political decision in areas such as taxation, income redistribution and government size. However, there are significant disparities in union activity throughout Europe. In 1990s, Denmark enforced a series of reforms that deregulated labor market structure towards greater flexibility. Today, Denmark's labor market is cited as the most competitive in the world (link). From 1990 to 2007, union density decreased from 75.3 percent to 69.1 percent. On the other side, labor market structures in Continental and Mediterranean Europe are known for inflexible features, regulation and rigidity. Meanwhile, Anglo-Saxon countries, Britain and Ireland, are known for flexible labor markets and few barriers impeding labor market performance. Dismissing and employee costs 10 weekly salaries in Ireland compared to 56 weekly salaries in Spain.
Although variation in trade union density over time explains a relatively large part of variation in productivity, union activity and influence in political decision-making could be the decisive factor in explaining cross-country variation in labor market outcome. That would requiring the design of principal indicator that could measure union influence on the quantitive basis. The influence of trade unions has, in my opinion, a strong common connection to cultural patterns and informal institutions.
For instance, countries with weak rule of law, persistent corruption, high tax burden and barriers to trade and investment, tend to have larger underground economies. Empirical estimates on the size of underground economies suggest that, in Europe (link), Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal) have the largest share of shadow economies. There is a significant cross-country variation. The estimates of shadow economies for 28 transition countries is 40.1 percent and 16.3 percent for the OECD. So, could union activity affect the size of shadow economies
If unions, as an interest group, exert a strong influence in politics, their political philosophy will probably lean left. Thus, if unions influence decisions on taxation issues, welfare benefits, pension schemes and government size, the outcome will probably induce more complexity, more regulation and more barriers to trade, entrepreneurship and investment. The combination of those factors can strongly influence labor and business incentives and, hence, also determine and productivity growth.
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