OPEC AND THE LOGIC OF CARTELS

Recently, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) celebrated its 50th anniversary (link). The organization was founded in 1960 with the purpose of regulating world's oil prices and controlling the supplies of oil. Currently, OPEC controls 80 percent of world's proven oil reserves and its 12 member states oil production capacity accounts for 40 percent of world's total oil production.

OPEC's oil production and the world economy

Source: The Economist (link)

As a profit-maximizing monopolist, OPEC is faced with a downward sloping demand curve and upward sloping marginal cost curve which represents the market supply curve of the orgaization's 12 member states. As a profit-maximizing agent, OPEC countries equate marginal cost of production and marginal revenue from oil supplies and thus extract the entire consumer surplus from oil importing countries such as the United States, Japan and the European Union. There are several plausible explanation of OPEC's monopoly power in the world oil market. First, oil is a good with no close substitutes. Thus, the price elasticity of oil demand curve is significantly price inelastic. The average empirical estimate of the world price elasticity of demand for oil is -0.4, suggesting that a 10 percent increase in the price of oil would, on average, reduce the market demand for oil by 4 percent, ceteris paribus.

The relationship between the total revenue of the monopolist and the elasticity of demand suggests that the unit elasticity of demand is the revenue-maximizing point elasticity of demand for the monopoly firm such as OPEC. As the graph shows, OPEC's price spikes occured mostly during external shocks such as the 1973 oil shocks, Arab-Israeli war and the recent financial crisis. The spikes in the world price of oil reflected the pure logic of OPEC's cartel. By pushing the price upward, OPEC countries realized that, in the short run, the price elasticity of demand for oil is even more inelastic, thus reducing the consumer surplus of oil importing countries while expanding the producer surplus of OPEC member states.

The strategic behavior of OPEC mostly depends on the nature of external shocks affecting the production capacity and reserves of world's oil supplies. During political conflicts, the short-run demand for oil spiked and, therefore, the price elasticity of demand for oil decreased, increasing OPEC's short run producer surplus. Thereupon, OPEC member states set oil production quotas which exactly reflected the organization's intention to extract the entire consumer surplus from oil importing countries. Also, during the pre-2008 economic boom, the economic growth in emerging markets further inflated the world price of oil since the OPEC's short run production capacity outpaced the quotas set by the organization. But during the recent financial crisis, the short-run response of OPEC has been the reduction of per barrel oil price as an strategic step towards maintain the stability of market demand for oil. During the recent crisis, personal consumption and incomes have fallen substantially and therefore, assuming the positive income elasticity of demand for oil, the world demand for oil decreased considerably. The change in the aggregate consumption of oil has led to relatively more price elastic demand for oil. Partly, the increase in the price elasticity of oil is explained by the technological innovation and market access to long-run substitutes of oil such as fuel-efficient and electric vehicles and electric cars.

The technological development of fuel-efficient vehicles has decreased the monopoly power of OPEC by increasing the price elasticity of demand for oil due to the availibility of closer substitutes. In the follow-up of the financial crisis, the OPEC set the per barrel price of oil at $75. Given the downward sloping market demand curve, the short-run oil consumption increased and OPEC thus raised the relative price of oil's substitutes since it acknowledged the switching costs of changing the consumption of durable goods which complement the consumption of oil. What OPEC did is that it attempted to establish the short-run price elasticity of oil close to unity and, thereby, effectively increase the total revenue of the organization's member states. However, if in the long run, the market demand for oil was elastic, the net effect of increasing the price of oil, would incidentally fall on the burden of OPEC producers. Therefore, relatively price inelastic demand and price elastic oil supply is the main source of OPEC's monopoly power in the world oil market.

The rationale behind the cartelled market organization of oil supply is the stability of demand for oil across the world. Could OPEC's monopoly power, in effect, be broken if one country would set asymmetric prices on the global oil market. The desire of OPEC member states to fully collude in the cartel is the well-known phenomena from industrial organization known as the trigger strategy. According to trigger strategy, a member of the cartel is likely to divert from the cartel's strategy only if long-term gains outpace short-term losses of acting in accordance with the cartel's strategic behavior. In purely theoretical terms, if Nash equlibrium exists in the long-term benefits of cooperation, the diversion from cartel's strategic behavior, will not be feasible.

Even though some OPEC member states face asymmetric market demand curves in the short run, the stability of world oil demand embodied in the relatively price inelastic oil demand decrease the feasibility of defection from the cartel's strategic targets, discounted benefits from the collusion far outpace potential short-term losses.

EARNINGS AND EDUCATION: A SURVEY

In 2009, the median weekly earnings of workers with bachelor's degrees were $1,137. This amount is 1.8 times the average amount earned by those with only a high school diploma, and 2.5 times the earnings of high school dropouts (link).

SKILLED IMMIGRATION AND INNOVATION

A recent paper by Jennifer Hunt (link) finds that the increase in foreign-born graduates strongly contributes to the innovation in the United States:

"In this paper I have demonstrated the important boost to innovation per capita provided by skilled immigration to the United States in 1950-2000. A calculation of the effect of immigration in the 1990-2000 period puts the magnitudes of the effects in context.

The 1990-2000 increase from 2.2% to 3.5% in the share of the population composed of immigrant college graduates increased patenting by at least 81:3 = 10:4%, and perhaps by as much as 18%. The increase in the share of post-college immigrants from 0.9% to 1.6% increased patenting by at least 10.5% and perhaps by as much as 24%. The increase from 0.30% to 0.55% in the share of workers who are immigrant scientists and engineers increased patenting by at least 13% but probably by less than 23%.

While I find evidence for the crowding-out of natives in the short run, in the long run there is evidence for the reverse: that skilled natives are attracted to states or occupations with skilled immigrants. The results hint that skilled immigrants innovate more than their native counterparts, especially if they are scientists or engineers. If correct, the result could reflect higher education of immigrants within skill categories, or positive selection of immigrants in terms of ability to innovate. However, the effect of natives is not as well identified econometrically as the effect of immigrants."

Thanks to New Economist (link) for the pointer!

WHY DO THE POOR CHOOSE TO LIVE IN CITIES?

In the recent edition of Yale Economic Review (link), Ed Glaeser, Matthew Kahn and Jordan Rappaport ponder one of the most difficult and challenging puzzles of urban economics:

"The 2000 U.S. Census shows that the average poverty rate in American cities drops significantly, from about 20% to 7.5%, as you move from the CBD of a city to its suburbs. How can we tell that this connection between city residence and poverty comes from treatment – that is, cities make people poor – rather than from selection, where the poor disproportionately move to central cities? Here, the data support selection: although ghettos may exacerbate poverty, poor people move disproportionately to the center of the cit- ies, either when switching homes or moving to a new metropolitan area... Given the high proportion of the urban poor who are Black, one might think that inner-city poverty is really just another example of the segregation of minorities. However, [the authors] found that poor Whites have roughly the same central city - suburb poverty gap as Blacks, so it is unlikely that race plays an important role in the centralization of the poor."

THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SODA TAX

Greg Mankiw (link) and David Leonhardt (link) have opened a debate on whether govenrment policymakers should levy a tax on soda and other soft drinks as an attempt to reverse the growing trend of obesity among the U.S. population. The idea of taxing soda has become popular as governments around the world have recorded high budget deficits and revenue shortfall. The real question is what would be the effects of taxing soda and, if so, would the introduction of the tax contribute to the reversal of the obesity pattern, especially among the child population.

There is a decent amount of empirical studies and health policy analyses on the patterns and causes of obesity. Obesity and the risk of premature death resulted from high blood pressure and the potential heart attack is the most individual cost of fast-food consumption. For a long period of time, we assumed that these costs at the individual level could be internalizied and, thus, raise no cost to the society. In the article published in Sunday's edition of NY Times Greg Mankiw drew parallels between soda and tobacco tax. If individuals consume a lot of cigarettes at home, there is, presumably, no negative externality shifted onto the society. The logic could be applied to soda taxation. However, there is a flip side to the argument. Taxing soda, tobacco and other goods with a negative impact on bystanders is an answer to the growing cost of health care delivery to the individuals who consume these goods. The adverse impact levied on other individuals is seen through higher health insurance premiums and total cost of health care.

John Cawley published an extensive analysis of the causes of early childhood obesity (link), suggesting greater government intervention and various cost-effectiveness measures to mitigate the adverse impact of childhood obesity on other members of the society. A study by Jason M. Fletcher, Daniel Frisvold and Nathan Tefft (link) has been one of the first attempts to measure the effect of vending machines restriction on childhood obesity. The authors concluded by suggesting higher tax rates and soft drink access restrictions in schools to fight the on-going increase in childhood obesity.

As Kelly Brownell of Yale Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity mentioned, the link between sugary drinks and obesity is stronger than the link between obesity and any other kind of food (link). The evidence suggests that distance from fast-food restaurant is a significant feature of childhood obesity. A study conducted by Janet Currie et. al (2009) has shown that among children in the 9th grade, a fast-food restaurant within 1/10 of the mile in school is associated with at least 5.2 percent increase in obesity rates (link). The study found that the direct impact of distance from the fast-food restaurant is significantly larger for less educated African-American and less educated women.

The question is whether taxing soda and other kinds of fizzy drinks could potentially reduce and/or reverse the growing trend of obesity. The basic question to start with, is what is the elasticity of demand for soda drinks. The estimates suggests that price elasticity of demand for the majority of soda drinks ranges from -0.8 to -1.0. For example, -1.0 elasticity coefficient suggests that a 10 percent increase in the price of soda would - ceteris paribus - lead to 10 percent decrease in soda drink consumption. The price elasticity of demand for soda drink is relatively high considering that coefficients of price elasticity of demand for other kinds of food ranges from -0.2 to -0.5. If policymakers considered the introduction of a tax on soda consumption, the relevant question is who would bear the burden of the tax? Given elastic demand, the tax would be beared by consumers. However, high price elasticity of demand suggests that there is a widely availible range of close substitutes with potentially negative adverse effects for the individuals. So it is not unlikely that children would switch to other kinds of fast food with equally negative impact on obesity, blood pressure and quality of living.

Given the lack of experiments and availibility of household surveys, it is difficult to estimate the consumer response to the introduction of tax on soda. The estimate of price elasticity of demand suggests that part of the tax would be beared by the consumer. However, it also suggests that a change in the relative price of soda would induce children to consume other varieties of fizzy drinks. Experimental studies by health policy experts suggests different approaches to tackling the adverse impact of soda drinks and other kinds of fast food. The most notable approach is the restriction of vending machines in school districts. However, restricting the access to vending machines would encourage the consumption of fast food outside school districts. A general tax on soda would be preferable to the restrictions of access of vending machines. There is absolutely no doubt that a tax would discourage consumption of soda and other kinds of fast food. Estimates suggest that soda and other kinds of fast food such as hamburgers, donuts and cakes are complementary. Assume, the cross-price elasticity of demand for burgers is -0.9 Thus, if the price per unit os soda increases by 10 percent, the demand for donuts, burgers and cakes decreases by 9 percent (0.9×10 percent). Since a tax on soda would raise the relative price of soda, the consumption of these kinds of fast food would diminish, resulting in less adverse impact of fast food consumption on the individuals. I would disagree with the statement that negative externalities from soda and fast food consumption are internalized by the individual. For example, an article by Trasande, Liu, Fryer and Weitzman (2009) published in Health Affairs (link) investigated the annual cost of childhood obesity in the U.S. between 2001 and 2005, based on the nationally representative data from U.S. hospitals admissions. The authors found that from 1999 to 2005, obesity-related hospitalizations doubled. In addition, costs related to hospitalization, treatment and diagnosis of obesity increased from $125.9 to $237.6 million, an 88.7 percent increase. The cost is partly beared by Medicare while the rest of the total cost is beared by the private insurance premiums.

Given the perverse system of employer-provided health care and implicit subsidizing of health insurance suppliers by the federal government, the periodic increase in obesity-related health care costs indicates a further rise in Medicare expenditures and health insurance premiums. In such conditions, there is little incentive for children and parents to reverse the consumption of soda drinks and fast food. Taxing soda and complementary fast food is a step in the right direction. But it should be noted that the introduction of a tax on soda should be compensated by a corresponding decrease in personal income tax. However, without the parent-guided awareness of the adverse impact of fast food on obesity, it would be difficult to reverse the increasing pattern and cost of childhood and adult obesity. Therefore, much of the obesity-related health care risk in childhood can be solved within the household. It would be irrational and foolish to believe that a tax on soda and government paternalism could solve the obesity puzzle and mitigate its neighborhood effects on bystanders.

INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Gary Becker (link) and Richard Posner (link) opened an intense debate on the issue of a growing US income inequality since 1980s onwards.

GOOD NEWS ON GOOD FRIDAY

From BLS (link):

"Nonfarm payroll employment increased by 162,000 in March, and the unemploymentrate held at 9.7 percent, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Temporary help services and health care continued to add jobs over the month. Employment in federal government also rose, reflecting the hiring of temporaryworkers for Census 2010. Employment continued to decline in financial activities and in information. Among the major worker groups, the unemployment rates for adult men (10.0 percent), adult women (8.0 percent), teenagers (26.1 percent), whites (8.8 percent), blacks (16.5 percent), and Hispanics (12.6 percent) showed little or no change in March."

THE CASE FOR CARBON TAX

Ted Gayer of the Brookings Institution testified before the U.S Senate, discussing the economic benefits of carbon tax over cap-and-trade (link)

MINIMUM WAGE AND OBESITY

David O. Meltzer and Zhuo Chen explored the relationship between minimum wage rate in the U.S and body weight (link):

"Growing consumption of increasingly less expensive food, and especially “fast food”, has been cited as a potential cause of increasing rate of obesity in the United States over the past several decades. Because the real minimum wage in the United States has declined by as much as half over 1968-2007 and because minimum wage labor is a major contributor to the cost of food away from home we hypothesized that changes in the minimum wage would be associated with changes in bodyweight over this period. To examine this, we use data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System from 1984-2006 to test whether variation in the real minimum wage was associated with changes in body mass index (BMI). We also examine whether this association varied by gender, education and income, and used quantile regression to test whether the association varied over the BMI distribution. We also estimate the fraction of the increase in BMI since 1970 attributable to minimum wage declines. We find that a $1 decrease in the real minimum wage was associated with a 0.06 increase in BMI. This relationship was significant across gender and income groups and largest among the highest percentiles of the BMI distribution. Real minimum wage decreases can explain 10% of the change in BMI since 1970. We conclude that the declining real minimum wage rates has contributed to the increasing rate of overweight and obesity in the United States. Studies to clarify the mechanism by which minimum wages may affect obesity might help determine appropriate policy responses."

NOBEL PRIZE IN ECONOMICS 2009

This year's Nobel prize in economics goes to Elinor Ostrom and Oliver E. Williamson (link). Elinor Ostrom received the prize for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons while Oliver E. Williamson received the prize for his contributions to the economic governance, emphasizing the boundaries of the firm and its role in conflict resolution and case bargaining.

Michael Spence, the 2001 Nobel prize winner, briefly summarized (link) the main contributions of Elinor Ostrom and Oliver E. Williamson to the economic theory.

ANTITRUST, MARKETS AND COMPETITION

Earlier today, I read Steve Forbes's discussion (link) of recent antitrust reaction to the announced Yahoo-Microsoft search-engine global partnership deal (here and here) by the Department of Justice. The merger of Yahoo and Microsoft is ought to create a new competitor to tackle Google's supposed 75 percent market share in search advertising. Back in 2008, Department of Justice swatted the aligned Google-Yahoo search-advertising partnership, saying that "it would have furthered Google's monopoly"(link). Google is currently also under investigation by Department of Justice which accusses Google of copyright infringement in company's book-scanning project (link). In addition, Christine Varney, Obama's antitrust appointee at the Department of Justice, targeted Google's dominance in search-ad market by blaming the company for "starting to colonize the emerging cloud-computing industry and amassing enormous market power" which customers would hardly escape.

The antitrust policy enhanced by Sherman Act, Clayton Act and Robinson-Patman Act prohibits the so-called "predatory behavior" that could restrain trade, induce monopolization efforts or impose unfair trade practices such as price discrimination. The antitrust targeting of Google has been inspired by the antitrust case from 1964 United States vs. Aluminium Company of America in which the court, headed by Judge Learned Hand, laid down a landmark decision that "under certain circumstances, a company may come to dominate its field through superior skill, foresight and industry." (here, here and here).

Donald Marron, former CEA economist, recently wrote a nice piece on how Google may defend itself against Department's potential antitrust investigation (link). First, Dept. of Justice will face a difficult task in defining Google's relevant market. Antitrust commentators often point out that Google possesses more than 70 percent of revenues in search-advertising market. However, Google's top antitrust attorney say that such definition of the relevant market is too narrow, arguing that the company actually receives less than 2 percent of revenues from search-ad market. The merger of Yahoo and Microsoft's internet search-engines could deteriorate Google's market share.

The enforcement of antitrust policy in preserving competitive market structures has resulted in complete failures several times. Recently, the European Commission imposed € 1.06 billion fine on Intel Corporation for exercising illegal practices such as giving loyalty discounts and implicit rebates to computer manufacturers and major retailer under the condition that Intel's chips are integrated into CPUs. The Commission argued that such "illegal practices" prevented customers from choosing alternative products (link) and thus, Intel supposedly abused the dominant position. That is against the provisions of EC Treaty.

The enactment of antitrust policy relies on the idea of competitive market structures. Microeconomic theory teaches that a monopoly leads to a deadweight loss and, thus, its relative efficiency is inferior to competitive market structure which operate under zero-profit assumption. However, the classic microeconomic theory neglects economies of scale in industries with significant fixed costs and entry costs such as high tech, health-care and airline.

However, antitrust policy embodied in Clayton Act, Sherman Act and other legislative acts, often leads to protectionist pressures from interest groups since the enforcement of antitrust is driven by the political process. Thomas DiLorenzo, famous Austrian economist, showed how interest group use lobbying pressures to exercise antitrust policy in favor of protecting competitors rather than competition (link).

In recent years Google acquired several smaller companies. The Federal Trade Commission and Dept. of Justice, for instance, put the acquisition of DoubleClick in 2008 under investigation. However, acquisitions in tech industry could produce significant efficiencies in distribution and consumer prices (link).

The notion of Sherman Act is that practices that restrain trade are illegal and doomed to be prosecuted. However, antitrust enforcers should recognized that high fixed costs and entry costs are not the result of market action or conspiracy but natural obstacle. Thus, industrial organization in technology, retail, health care and airline industries, enables significant economies of scale through lower average costs of production. This requires high levels of innovation including merging resources and joint cooperation. By the token of perfect competition for instance, Wal-Mart should be broken (link). If federal antitrust enforces forced Wal-Mart to split into more parts, gains in distribution which enable low prices and various discounts, would diminish considerably.

Thus, the real aim of antitrust enforcement should not be to prosecute successful firms and deprive them of productive gains, but to prevent alledged conspiracy that inhibits market entry and harms the consumers. In a free market, natural monopolies are short-lived and challenged by either new entrants or international competition.

CANADIAN AND THE U.S HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS COMPARED

A study by June O'Neill and Dave M. O'Neill (link) suggests that the U.S health care system provides more choice, efficiency, better delivery and capacity than the Canadian system:

"Does Canada's publicly funded, single payer health care system deliver better health outcomes and distribute health resources more equitably than the multi-payer heavily private U.S. system? We show that the efficacy of health care systems cannot be usefully evaluated by comparisons of infant mortality and life expectancy. We analyze several alternative measures of health status using JCUSH (The Joint Canada/U.S. Survey of Health) and other surveys. We find a somewhat higher incidence of chronic health conditions in the U.S. than in Canada but somewhat greater U.S. access to treatment for these conditions. Moreover, a significantly higher percentage of U.S. women and men are screened for major forms of cancer. Although health status, measured in various ways is similar in both countries, mortality/incidence ratios for various cancers tend to be higher in Canada. The need to ration resources in Canada, where care is delivered "free", ultimately leads to long waits. In the U.S., costs are more often a source of unmet needs. We also find that Canada has no more abolished the tendency for health status to improve with income than have other countries. Indeed, the health-income gradient is slightly steeper in Canada than it is in the U.S."

THE ORIGINS OF OBESITY

David Cutler, Ed Glaeser and Jesse Shapiro provide the evidence of high rates of obesity in the United States (link):

"Americans have become considerably more obese over the past 25 years. This increase is primarily the result of consuming more calories. The increase in food consumption is itself the result of technological innovations which made it possible for food to be mass prepared far from the point of consumption, and consumed with lower time costs of preparation and cleaning. Price changes are normally beneficial, but may not be if people have self-control problems. This applies to some population."

THE COST OF FREE TIME

This is what I chased in NYT (link):

GLAESER ON EDUCATION

Ed Glaeser of Harvard University provides a detailed insight on the importance of human capital for economic growth (link):

"Schools can also attract more talent with an environment that welcomes talented outsiders instead of erecting bureaucratic barriers that prevent their success. The literature on teacher certification finds few benefits from that hurdle. By contrast, Teach for America has achieved remarkable results by putting capable young people, often with little formal training as teachers, in classrooms. The experience illustrates that it isn't easy to assess teacher quality with standard teaching credentials. If attracting a wave of good people into teaching is the first step, the second step is keeping the best teachers and redirecting the rest. Performance in the classroom is the best way to know if a teacher is a success. Teacher promotion and tenure needs to be based on clear performance measures, including student test scores. Perhaps teachers unions could start endorsing the use of test scores to evaluate their members and determine tenure."

COMPETITION, MARKETS AND DISCRIMINATION

Professors' Gary S. Becker and Richard Posner articles on the economics of discrimination (here and here) gave me an interesting motivation to discuss some economic aspects of discrimination which is a popular question into the economic analysis.

The Framework of Labor Market

Discrimination is a relatively young and still fresh theme in economic analysis. It has been pioneered by professor Becker's The Economics of Discrimination (link). The analytical foundations of the economic analysis of discrimination can be found in the attempt to measure discrimination in the labor market and elsewhere by the empirical analysis. In a simple, two-variable model of labor market determined by wage and quantity of labor, there is not a unique equilibrium of demand and supply in the labor market. The demand for labor is downward sloping, reflecting the fact that lower wage (the price of labor) tends to induce the demand for labor. For example, if the wage for software engineer drops from 8 EUR per hour to 6,5 EUR per hour, then Google, for example, will certainly not feel reluctant to hire more skilled software engineers. It should be noted that the slope of labor demand curve is much flatter than demand curves in partial equlibrium models usually behave. The reason is that firms hire labor supply in order to maximize profits and firm's utility function. However, there is no simple marginal rate of substitution between labor and other means of production and that labor suppliers' knowledge, skills and profession determine the result of firm's production function. Also, there is not a unique picture of labor supply, since workers possess different preferences regarding the allocation of time between leisure and consumption. For example, productivity gains by Google engineers may induce them either to increase the amount of leisure time they consume or to allocate even more time to research and product development. In economics, to sketch a brief picture of labor market, we use regression analysis to depict labor demand and supply curve where the wage as an endogenous variable is determined by the inclination of demand curve and the quantity of labor as an exogenous variable. Since a decreasing wage rate induces the demand for labor, demand curve is, expectedly, downward sloping. On the other hand, labor supply is upward-sloping since employees are not reluctant to supply more free time when the rate of real wages is increasing. Even though labor market is a partial equilibrium model of employer-employee preferences, discrimination has often resulted in a two-sector labor market where skills and knowledge are traded in separate markets as shown by the picture.

How Discrimination is Motivated?

There are two types of discrimination in the labor market. First, employers discriminate when they hire labor supply with higher wage rate, even though other labor supplier are cheaper relative to their productivity than labor suppliers hired by the employer. In this case, discrimination is motivated by employer preference of future employees by race, religion, sex or other human charateristics. An employer who discriminates has a comparative disadvantage compared to employers who do not discriminate since first employer's profits are lower due to the fact that first employer's competitor scores better on productivity performance and profit while his relative market-clearing price of labor is lower. Employer discrimination can be enforced with strong cultural and institutional background. In former socialist economies, such as Slovenia, regulated and rigid labor market protected the premium of insiders while it, at the same time, increased entry and career barriers to future employees. Thus, with the lack of productivity convergence and high tax burden, employers in Slovenia are reluctant to hire high-skilled labor supply because of (1) high bargaining power of trade unions and because (2) age-determined income distribution favors older workers compared to younger workers even though older workers in infant industries do not posses high human capital skills as college graduates do. Consequently, human capital premium has been replaced by age premium. In job advertisment, employers often put experience ahead of knowledge and ideas, thus restricting job and career prospects to labor market entrants. On the other hand, employee discrimination occurs when employees, for example, refuse to work with minority workers, demanding real compensation. Regulated labor market structure is, most notably, a cause of employee discrimination since workers possessing more bargaining power tend to discriminate workers with weaker concentration of bargaining power, thus requesting higher premium enabled by the formal (trade union) or informal (intra-market nets) monopoly of existing labor supply. Nonetheless, the attempt to exterminate labor market discrimination by the exercising regulation results in information asymmetry, giving privilege to inside workers' privileges such as seniority and their bargaining power over the medium term (see: Lindbeck, Snower 2002).

Competitive Markets, Economic Freedom and Flexibility

For example, in the old American south, African Americans were often discriminated by local employers (link). Thus, the old South was put in a comparative disadvantage in comparison with Northern and Western states which faced higher productivity growth rates and profits. The situation led to a gap between northern-western and southern states; the latter having lower living standards because of the productivity lag as a partial result of labor market discrimination. The deregulation of labor market is essential to less discrimination since economic freedom such as freedom of trade, enterprise and labor, leads employers to relatively less beneficial discriminatory hiring preferences unless employers prefer lower profit. In Europe, where labor markets are more regulated than in countries such as the United States, Singapore, Denmark and Australia, regulated labor markets lead to lower productivity performance, except that age and experience-based discrimination substituted racial or sexual discrimation at the workplace. Consequently, the standard of living in European welfare states is significantly lower than in the United States. For example, cost decreases in child care, as a result of competition, put more mothers into the labor market in the United States and Canada (link) while the percentage of mothers in the labor market, while having child-care liabilities, is significantly lower in Europe, reflecting regulated and rigid labor market designed by the intervention of trade unions. In freer labor markets where employers have fewer discrimination preferences, firms score higher on productivity, human capital and profits, advantaging employers with non-discriminatory hiring practices while putting employers with discriminatory hiring (related to race, skin color, religion, sex or any other characteristic) in a serious relative disadvantage.

CUTTING TAXES, FALLING POVERTY

Art Laffer and Stephen Moore offer a brilliant evidence on how lower tax rates expanded income increases (here):

"The new Census Bureau data on income and poverty reveal that many of the economic trends in this country are a lot more favorable than America's detractors seems to think. In 2007, overall real median family income increased to $50,233, up $600 from 2006. The real median income for intact families -- mother and father in the home -- rose to $78,000, an all-time high. Although incomes fell sharply in the U.S. after the dot-com bubble burst in 2000 (and still haven't fully recovered), these latest statistics reflect a 25-year trend of upward economic mobility. More important, Barack Obama is wrong when he states on his campaign Web site that the economic policies started by Ronald Reagan have rewarded "wealth not work." Based on this false claim -- that the rich have benefited by economic growth while others have not -- he intends to raise tax rates on high-income individuals. To be sure, there has been a massive amount of wealth created in America over the last 25 years. But tax rates were cut dramatically across the income spectrum, for rich and poor alike. The results?
When all sources of income are included -- wages, salaries, realized capital gains, dividends, business income and government benefits -- and taxes paid are deducted, households in the lowest income quintile saw a roughly 25% increase in their living standards from 1983 to 2005. (See chart nearby; the data is from the Congressional Budget Office's "Comprehensive Household Income.") This fact alone refutes the notion that the poor are getting poorer. They are not...Looking at the last two business cycles (first year of recovery to first year of recovery), this low-income group experienced a 10% rise in their inflation-adjusted after-tax incomes from 1983 to 1992 and then another 11% rise from 1992 to 2002). Roughly speaking, the Reagan and Clinton presidencies were equally good for them. Income gains over the last 30 years have been systematically understated due to several factors. These include:
- Fall in people per household. The gains in household income undercount the actual gains per person, because the average number of people living in low-income households has been shrinking. On a per capita basis, the real income gain for low-income households was 44% from 1983 to 2005, about 22% from 1983 to 1992 and about 18% from 1992 to 2002. These are excellent numbers by any measure. Earned income tax credit effect. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a government payment to low income people who work. It was instituted on a small scale in 1975. In 1986, 1990, 1993 and 2001, Congress expanded the program ...Over time the EITC has multiplied the number of poor households that fill out tax forms each year and are thus counted in government income statistics. That's because to be eligible to receive the refundable EITC, a tax return must be filed ...Official tax return data show that in 1983, 19% of returns had zero tax liability; that percentage has climbed steadily, reaching 33% in 2005. (The Tax Policy Center estimates that in 2008 nearly 40% of filers will have no income tax liability.) Thus, we are now statistically counting more poorer families today than we used to. This is a major reason that median and poor household income gains appear to be a lot smaller than they have been in reality. Income mobility. In the U.S., people who had low incomes in 1983 didn't necessarily have incomes as low a decade later. People in this country have long moved up over time, and this income mobility continues to be true. While some people do remain in the lowest income group, they are the exception ...One way to quantify income mobility is to examine how many people remain in the same tax bracket over time. We compared the returns of tax filers in the lowest tax rate bracket (zero) in 1987 with their returns in 1996. Only one third of the tax filers were still in the zero tax bracket, but 25% were now in the 10% bracket, 32% had moved up to the 15% bracket and 9% were in the 25%, 28%, 33% or 35% brackets. And that was following them for a decade, not a generation ... From 1996 to 2005, we have the income mobility data for income quintiles. Of those filers who were in the lowest 20% in 1996 and who also filed in 2005, 42.4% remained in the bottom 20%, 28.6% were in the next highest quintile, 13.9% were in the middle quintile, 9.9% were in the second highest quintile, and 5.3% were in the highest quintile ...What is also striking about the data is that the poor today are, in general, not the same people who were poor even a few years ago. For example, the new Census data find that only 3% of Americans are "chronically" poor, which the Census Bureau defines as being in poverty for three years or more. Many of the people in the bottom quintile of income earners in any one year are new entrants to the labor force or those who are leaving the labor force. Obviously, there is also a significant core of truly poor people in this group, but that core is drastically less than 100%.
The data also show downward mobility among the highest income earners. The top 1% in 1996 saw an average decline in their real, after-tax incomes by 52% in the next 10 years.
America is still an opportunity society where talent and hard work can (almost always) overcome one's position at birth or at any point in time. Perhaps the best piece of news in this regard is the reduction in gaps between earnings of men and women, and between blacks and whites over the last 25 years ...Census Bureau data of real income gains from 1980 to 2005 show the rise in incomes based on gender and race. White males have had the smallest gains in income (up 9%), while black females have had by far the largest increase in income (up 79%). White females were up 74% and black males were up 34%. Income gaps within groups are rising, but the gaps among groups are declining. People are being rewarded in today's economy based on what they know and what they can do, not on the basis of who their parents are or the color of their skin ...There are of course Americans who live in poverty, as there are very affluent Americans with $25 million yachts and $10 million homes who hold ostentatious $200,000 birthday parties. But the evidence is plain that all groups across the income distribution have made solid gains during the last generation ... Taking from the rich through much higher tax rates in order to help the poor and middle class makes no sense intellectually and has seldom worked in practice. Reducing rates, on the other hand, does increase the share of taxes paid by the highest income-earning group. For example, in 1981, when the highest tax rate on the rich was 70% and the top capital gains tax rate was close to 45%, the richest 1% of Americans paid 17% of total income taxes. In 2005, with a top income tax rate of 35% and capital gains at 15%, the richest 1% of Americans paid 39%.
We suspect that Mr. Obama will discover that when you put "tax fairness" ahead of economic progress, you produce neither."

DOING BUSINESS 2009

World Bank has issued the recent report Doing Business 2009, comparing countries throughout the world regarding the ease of doing business and entrepreneurship (link).

WHY HUMAN CAPITAL MATTERS

Professor Glaeser of Harvard University wrote an interesting article, addressing the issue of importance of human capital for economic growth, income and welfare (here):

"Also since the mid-1970s, America has become much more unequal. Not all inequality is bad. I wouldn't mind if the guys who gave us Google earned even more, given their contributions to society. I do, however, care deeply that millions of Americans seem to have reaped, at best, modest benefits from the past 30 years of technological change... By contrast, investing in human capital offers the potential for permanent increases in earnings that encourage work. Education increases the ability to deal with innovation, so that investing in skills today will make Americans better able to weather the storms of future technological changes."

BEST PLACES FOR DOING BUSINESS

Forbes.com recently published its annual global research (link) on the attraction of particular countries on doing business from macroeconomic and microeconomic point of view. According to Forbes, the best place for doing business is Denmark, followed by Ireland, Finland, United States and United Kingdom. Among top 10 there are also Sweden, Canada, Singapore, Hong Kong and Estonia.