Earlier today, I read Steve Forbes's discussion (link) of recent antitrust reaction to the announced Yahoo-Microsoft search-engine global partnership deal (here and here) by the Department of Justice. The merger of Yahoo and Microsoft is ought to create a new competitor to tackle Google's supposed 75 percent market share in search advertising. Back in 2008, Department of Justice swatted the aligned Google-Yahoo search-advertising partnership, saying that "it would have furthered Google's monopoly"(link). Google is currently also under investigation by Department of Justice which accusses Google of copyright infringement in company's book-scanning project (link). In addition, Christine Varney, Obama's antitrust appointee at the Department of Justice, targeted Google's dominance in search-ad market by blaming the company for "starting to colonize the emerging cloud-computing industry and amassing enormous market power" which customers would hardly escape.
The antitrust policy enhanced by Sherman Act, Clayton Act and Robinson-Patman Act prohibits the so-called "predatory behavior" that could restrain trade, induce monopolization efforts or impose unfair trade practices such as price discrimination. The antitrust targeting of Google has been inspired by the antitrust case from 1964 United States vs. Aluminium Company of America in which the court, headed by Judge Learned Hand, laid down a landmark decision that "under certain circumstances, a company may come to dominate its field through superior skill, foresight and industry." (here, here and here).
Donald Marron, former CEA economist, recently wrote a nice piece on how Google may defend itself against Department's potential antitrust investigation (link). First, Dept. of Justice will face a difficult task in defining Google's relevant market. Antitrust commentators often point out that Google possesses more than 70 percent of revenues in search-advertising market. However, Google's top antitrust attorney say that such definition of the relevant market is too narrow, arguing that the company actually receives less than 2 percent of revenues from search-ad market. The merger of Yahoo and Microsoft's internet search-engines could deteriorate Google's market share.
The enforcement of antitrust policy in preserving competitive market structures has resulted in complete failures several times. Recently, the European Commission imposed € 1.06 billion fine on Intel Corporation for exercising illegal practices such as giving loyalty discounts and implicit rebates to computer manufacturers and major retailer under the condition that Intel's chips are integrated into CPUs. The Commission argued that such "illegal practices" prevented customers from choosing alternative products (link) and thus, Intel supposedly abused the dominant position. That is against the provisions of EC Treaty.
The enactment of antitrust policy relies on the idea of competitive market structures. Microeconomic theory teaches that a monopoly leads to a deadweight loss and, thus, its relative efficiency is inferior to competitive market structure which operate under zero-profit assumption. However, the classic microeconomic theory neglects economies of scale in industries with significant fixed costs and entry costs such as high tech, health-care and airline.
However, antitrust policy embodied in Clayton Act, Sherman Act and other legislative acts, often leads to protectionist pressures from interest groups since the enforcement of antitrust is driven by the political process. Thomas DiLorenzo, famous Austrian economist, showed how interest group use lobbying pressures to exercise antitrust policy in favor of protecting competitors rather than competition (link).
In recent years Google acquired several smaller companies. The Federal Trade Commission and Dept. of Justice, for instance, put the acquisition of DoubleClick in 2008 under investigation. However, acquisitions in tech industry could produce significant efficiencies in distribution and consumer prices (link).
The notion of Sherman Act is that practices that restrain trade are illegal and doomed to be prosecuted. However, antitrust enforcers should recognized that high fixed costs and entry costs are not the result of market action or conspiracy but natural obstacle. Thus, industrial organization in technology, retail, health care and airline industries, enables significant economies of scale through lower average costs of production. This requires high levels of innovation including merging resources and joint cooperation. By the token of perfect competition for instance, Wal-Mart should be broken (link). If federal antitrust enforces forced Wal-Mart to split into more parts, gains in distribution which enable low prices and various discounts, would diminish considerably.
Thus, the real aim of antitrust enforcement should not be to prosecute successful firms and deprive them of productive gains, but to prevent alledged conspiracy that inhibits market entry and harms the consumers. In a free market, natural monopolies are short-lived and challenged by either new entrants or international competition.
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